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Abstract. The development of effective knowledge discovery techniques has become a very active research area
in recent years due to the important impact it has had in several relevant application domains. One interesting task
therein is that of singling out anomalous individuals from a given population, e.g., to detect rare events in time-
series analysis settings, or to identify objects whose behavior is deviant w.r.t. a codified standard set of rules. Such
exceptional individuals are usually referred to as outliers in the literature.
In this paper, the concept of outlier is formally stated in the context of knowledge-based systems, by generalizing
that originally proposed in [7] in the context of default theories. The chosen formal framework here is that of
logic programming, wherein potential applications of techniques for outlier detection are thoroughly discussed.
The proposed formalization is a novel one and helps to shed light on the nature of outliers occurring in logic bases.
Also the exploitation of minimality criteria in outlier detection is illustrated.
The computational complexity of outlier detection problems arising in this novel setting is also thoroughly investi-
gated and accounted for in the paper. Finally, rewriting algorithms are proposed that transform any outlier detection
problem into an equivalent inference problem under stable model semantics, thereby making outlier computation
effective and realizable on top of any stable model solver.
Keywords: outlier detection, logic programming, knowledge representation, nonmonotonic reasoning, com-
putational complexity.
1 Introduction
1.1 Statement of the Problem
The development of effective knowledge discovery techniques has become a very active research area in
recent yeas due to the important impact it has had in several relevant application areas. Knowledge discovery
comprises quite diverse tasks and associated methods. One interesting task therein is that of singling out
anomalous individuals from a given population, e.g., to detect rare events in time-series analysis settings, or
to identify objects whose behavior is deviant w.r.t. a codified standard set of “social” rules. Such exceptional
individuals are usually referred to as outliers in the literature.
Outlier detection has important applications in bioinformatics [1], fraud detection [33, 34], and intru-
sion detection [32, 48], just to cite a few. As a consequence, several approaches have been already devel-
oped to realize outlier detection, mainly by means of data mining techniques including clustering-based and
proximity-based methods as well as domain density analysis (see, e.g., [11, 3, 16, 55, 8, 12]). Usually, these
approaches model the “normal” behavior of individuals by performing some statistical kind of computation
on the given data set (various methods basically differ on the basis of the way such computation is carried
out) and, then, single out those individuals whose behavior or characteristics “significantly” deviate from
the normal ones.
As a first, quite simple, example of outlier detection, consider the following short story: Nino is a young
soccer player from Southern Italy. He has black hair and brown eyes. Where Nino lives, all people have
black hair and brown eyes. Nino has only one big passion, that is, playing soccer and he does not know
much about the world outside his home town. One day the boss of a team from Finland happens to see
Nino playing and likes him so much that he decides to propose a contract for Nino to play with his team in
Finland. A good wage is proposed, so Nino accepts, being also amazed by the strange appearance of this
guy coming from Finland. He has blonde hair and blue eyes, indeed: ‘He must really be a strange man’,
Nino must have thought. The day then arrives for Nino to move to Finland. His new boss welcomes him at
the airport in Helsinki and, together, they go to the football ground. In a large hall, the boss introduces Nino
to his colleagues and to other people working for the team. To his great surprise Nino notices that among
so many people in the hall there is just one person with black hair and brown eyes: that is, Nino himself !
The above example clarifies some simple and yet important concepts. At the beginning, Nino considered
the team boss from Finland an outlier, on the basis of the statistical evidence that all the people he had
ever seen had a different complexion. But at the end of the story, on the basis of the new observations he
has acquired in the hall, the team boss no longer appears to Nino as a strange individual. Thus, the story
firstly illustrates that outliers may be singled out precisely because there is a second set of data determining
their abnormality, which below will be called outlier witness. Hence, there is no outlier without a witness.
Moreover, the fact that at the end Nino himself appears to be an outlier with respect to his new colleagues
sheds some light on another aspect of outlier detection. Indeed, the story also indicates that an individual
might well be an outlier in one context, i.e., with respect to a given set of observations, while not being so
in a different one. It follows that while looking for outliers in general no assumption can be made on the
existence of properties characterizing outliers “per se”. Rather, outliers are to be detected only on the basis
of observations to hand, by eventually singling out some properties standing out for their abnormality.
In the short story, abnormality is just the result of a kind of implicitly computed statistic, which is
precisely what is commonly assumed by most of the approaches in the literature making use of “quantitative”
aspects of the observations only. However, while looking at a set of observations to discover outliers, it often
happens that there are some “qualitative” descriptions of the domain of interest, encoding, e.g., what an
expected normal behavior should be. As an example of such a description, which will be called background
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knowledge in the following, there might be a rule stating that people from Southern Italy have black hair and
brown eyes, thereby precisely encoding Nino’s observations about people from his place. This description
might be, for instance, derived by an expert and might be formalized by means of a suitable language for
knowledge representation, as shown in the following example, where logic programs under the stable model
semantics are considered.
Example 1. Suppose that during a visit to Australia you notice a mammal, say Donald, that you classify as
a platypus because of its graceful, yet comical appearance. However, it seems to you that Donald is giving
birth to a young, but this is very strange given that you know that a platypus is a peculiar mammal that
lays eggs. Formalizing this scenario as an outlier detection problem is simple. Indeed, observations can be
encoded as the facts {Mammal(Donald), GiveBirth(Donald), Platypus(Donald)} and the additional
knowledge by means of the following logical rule:
Platypus(X)← Mammal(X), not GiveBirth(X).
It is worthwhile noting that if you had not observed that Donald was a platypus, you would not have
inferred such a conclusion, given your background knowledge and the fact GiveBirth(Donald). However,
if for some reason you have doubted the fact that Donald was giving birth to its young, then it would come
as no surprise that Donald was a platypus. Therefore, the fact GiveBirth(Donald) is precisely recognized
to represent an outlier, whose anomaly is indeed witnessed by the fact Platypus(Donald). ⊳
Though still very simple, the example above conveys some of the relevant features occurring in the ex-
ploitation of a background knowledge for detecting outliers in a given set of observations. First, the example
evidences once again that abnormality of outliers is not defined in “absolute” terms, i.e., there is no explicit
encoding for the exceptions in the theory. In particular, outliers show up as kinds of anomalous individuals
that do not necessarily lead to a (logical) conflict, so that their isolation cannot be carried out in general by
exploiting inconsistencies between observations and the knowledge at hand. For instance, with the encoding
of the background knowledge in Example 1, there is no problem in assuming that all the three observations
hold: the logical rule is not inconsistent with the observations, and a model in fact exists. In this respect,
there is no explicit need to revise the knowledge and/or the observations.
Indeed, in outlier detection, the fact that an individual is an outlier has to be witnessed by a suitable as-
sociated set of observations, the outlier witness, which shows why the individual “deviates” from normality.
While in traditional (data-mining) approaches an individual to deviate is formalized on the basis of some
sort of statistics on the data, making use of qualitative descriptions about the domain of interest allows us to
exploit a rich, logic-based framework.
Specifically, the choice here is to assume that outlier witnesses are sets of facts that are “normally”
(that is in the absence of the outliers) explained by the domain knowledge which, in turns, entails precisely
the opposite of the witnesses whenever outliers are not singled out. In this way, witnesses are meant to
precisely characterize the abnormality of outliers with respect to both the theory and the other data at hand.
For instance, in Example 1, Platypus(Donald) is a witness for the outlier GiveBirth(Donald), since
Platypus(Donald) cannot be predicted by the theory given that one trusts in the fact GiveBirth(Donald),
but is immediately entailed as soon as GiveBirth(Donald) is thrown out.
It is worthwhile noting that from this perspective, outlier detection may be abstractly seen as a form
of diagnostic reasoning where diagnosis of anomalies has to be identified on the basis of some kind of
disagreement with the background knowledge and must be supported by some further evidence in the data
(such evidences being encoded in witness sets) — connections with this form of reasoning will be further
clarified in the following with some examples (cf. Example 3) and discussions.
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Clearly enough, detecting outliers by exploiting a logical characterization of the domain of interest is
generally more complex than it appears from Example 1. Therefore, in the presence of complex and richer
background knowledge, some automatic mechanisms for outlier identification via logic theories is defini-
tively needed. Formalizing these kinds of mechanism, discussing their complexity and providing computa-
tion algorithms is, in a nutshell, the contribution of this paper. In particular, the formalization here is carried
out by exploiting logic programs under the stable model semantics. This means that the background knowl-
edge, that is, what is known in general about the world (also called in the following rule component), and
the observations, that is, what is currently perceived about (possibly, a portion of) the world (also called in
the following observation component), are respectively encoded in the form of a logic program and a set of
facts under the stable models semantics.
In order to make the framework clearer, before detailing the major contributions of this paper, more
examples of outlier detection are provided and relationships with some related reasoning mechanisms are
discussed next.
1.2 Examples of Outlier Detection
Considering outlier detection problems in the presence of background knowledge may have several use-
ful applications. For instance, the concept of the outlier in database applications might be quite natural in
encoding such important tasks as maintaining database integrity through updates as discussed below.
While designing relational database applications, relations are often equipped with some kind of in-
tegrity constraints in order to enhance their expressiveness. In normal operative conditions databases are
assumed to be consistent, i.e., to satisfy all the integrity constraints. However, it may happen that this is
not the case, especially when data is the result of the integration of several autonomous sources such as
in datawarehouse and data integration contexts. In fact, the problem of identifying and handling inconsis-
tencies in databases has recently received a lot of attention (cf. [65, 14, 38, 62, 20]). Actually, most of the
proposed approaches define constraints using suitable fragments of first order logics, and mainly focus on
very simple constraints on data, such as functional dependencies and inclusion dependencies (see, e.g., [2]).
In those cases, constraint violations may be identified by means of simple queries over the database at hand.
However, more sophisticated forms of constraints modelling specific knowledge of the application domain
are left generally unexpressed. These kinds of constraint may encode, e.g., organizational rules or routinely
applied praxis, which should be formalized in order to construct a more precise modelling of the domain. In
these cases, the problem is that there is no obvious way for checking database integrity.
Outlier detection can in fact be used to examine database integrity by allowing for more sophisticated,
application-oriented forms of constraints. If an abnormal property is discovered in a database, i.e., a violation
of some constraint, the data source which reported this observation would have to be double-checked. An
example follows.
Example 2. Consider a bank B. The bank approves loan requests put forward by customers on the basis of
certain policies. As an example, assume that loan approval policies prescribe that loans for amounts greater
than 50K Euro have to come along with an endorsement provided as a guarantee by a third party. Information
about approved loan requests is stored in a number of relational tables, that are:
– REQLOAN(LOAN ID, CUSTOMER, AMOUNT), that records loan requests;
– ENDORSEMENT(LOAN ID, PARTY), that records the guaranteeing parties for loan requests for more
than 50K Euro;
– APPROVED(LOAN ID), that records approved loan requests.
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REQLOAN:
l1 c1 57.000
l2 c3 27.000
l3 c2 88.000
l4 c3 80.000
ENDORSEMENT:
l1 p1
l3 p2
l4 p4
APPROVED:
l1
l2
l4
UNRELIABLE: p1
p2
Fig. 1. Example instance of the bank database.
Moreover, the bank stores information about unreliable customers in the table UNRELIABLE(CUSTOMER)
collecting data from an external data source, such as, for example, consulting agencies providing information
about the financial records of individuals and companies. In Figure 1, an instance of the bank database is
reported.
With this knowledge to hand, the bank policy concerning loan approvals can be easily encoded using a
logical rule like the following:
Approved(L)← ReqLoan(L, C, A), A > 50.000, Endorsement(L, P), not Unreliable(P).
According to this knowledge, and by using the straightforward and well-known correspondence be-
tween relational tuples and logical facts (e.g., the tuple 〈l1〉 in relation APPROVED corresponds to the fact
Approved(l1)), it might be noticed that there is something strange with the loan l1 in Figure 1. In fact, since
the loan has been approved, the party p1 is supposed to be reliable. However, this is not the case, as emerges
by looking at the database provided by the consulting agency (see table UNRELIABLE).
Notice that if the fact Approved(l1) were dropped, the exact opposite would have been concluded,
namely that the loan l1 is not in the relation APPROVED, i.e., according to the normal behavior of the bank,
the loan l1 is not to be approved. Furthermore, if both the facts Unreliable(p1) and Approved(l1) were
dropped, again it would be concluded that l1 might be approved. This implies that the loan request l1 not
being approved is a consequence of the fact that p1 is not reliable, and hence Unreliable(p1) is an outlier
witnessed by Approved(l1). This entails that, in the above scenario, the bank has not trusted the consulting
agency since the bank has actually decided that p1 is to be considered indeed reliable. ⊳
Further potential applications of the logic-based framework for outlier detection comes in the context
of enhancing the reasoning capabilities of autonomous agents. Indeed, recall that computational logics have
been successfully exploited recently in the context of agent systems applications, since it is quite an effective
and powerful way for both modelling and prototypically implementing several forms of reasoning schemes
in such systems [45, 85, 83]. For instance, abductive logic programming approaches have been fruitfully
used to allow an agent to make hypotheses about the outer world and causes of observable events (e.g,
[21]), modal logic operators have been exploited to describe and realize agent behavior and to put it into
relationship with other agents in an agent society (e.g., [74]), and inductive techniques have been proposed
to enable an agent to “learn” from experience (e.g, [15]).
While exploiting different syntaxes and specific characteristics of the domains of interest, most of these
proposals share the same basic structural vision of the agent, which is often assumed to have its own,
trustable background knowledge about the world that is encoded in the form of a suitable theory. Then, after
some observations have been obtained describing the actual status of the outer environment, the agent might
try to achieve its application goals by performing some suitable reasoning tasks on the basis of both its
background knowledge and the observations. In usual agent operative conditions, one may assume that the
background knowledge and the observations logically harmonize. However, situations may occur for which
this is not the case. In such circumstances, it is desirable that the agent that has noticed some mismatch is
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r1 : down(X)← computer(X), not predecessorUp(X).
r2 : predecessorUp(X) ← wired(Y, X), up(Y).
r3 : up(X)← computer(X), not down(X).
r4 : computer(s). computer(a). · · · computer(t).
r5 : wired(s, a). · · · wired(g, t).
r6 : up(s).
Fig. 2. Computer network example.
also able to revise its background knowledge by incorporating the new evidence of the world. In particular,
in some cases the background knowledge and observations mismatch might be caused because there is
something “wrong” or “anomalous” with the observations themselves. This might happen, for instance, as
a consequence of noise occurring while sensing the outer environment or even because of the existence of
malicious agents supplying wrong information, and outlier detection may be fruitfully exploited to identify
such situations.
Clearly, the isolation of such anomalous observations offers a potentially useful source of additional
knowledge that might be exploited to better support the interaction among agents or simply to optimize the
way an agent pursues its goals. Indeed, outliers might be of a great interest, for they put into evidence the
presence of some situations possibly requiring an alert or a quick reaction by the agent. A detailed example
follows.
Example 3. Consider an agent A that is in charge of monitoring the connectivity status of the computer
network N shown on the right of Figure 2. The agent’s background knowledge is modelled by a logic
program P rlsN , which is used by A for assessing whether the computer s is connected to t. Program P rlsN (rule
component) consists of the rules shown on the left of Figure 2. In P rlsN , each computer, say X, is represented
by an atom computer(X), and connections among computers are denoted by means of the binary relation
wired. Moreover, for each computer X, the fact down(X) (resp. up(X)) encodes that X is offline (resp. online).
The topology of the network is encoded into the facts in r4 and r5. The meaning of the other rules in
P rlsN is as follows. Rule r1 defines the unary predicate down in a way that down(X) is true if there exists
no predecessor of the computer X (in the network) which is up; having a predecessor that is up is encoded
in the unary predicate predecessorUp defined in rule r2 that tells that a computer Y is a predecessor of X
in the case wired(Y, X) holds, and therefore PredecessorUp(X) is true if there is a computer Y such that
wired(Y, X) is true and such that Y is up. Rule r3 says that a computer is up if it is not down. Finally, the
fact in r6 states that the source s is known to be up.
In order to monitor the net, A observes the actual status of each computer X in the net. Hence, the agent
A has such an evidence modelled in the observation component by means of a set of facts, say P obsN , over
the predicates down and up.
It is important to note that program P rlsN encodes the normal behavior of the network and does not
explicitly account for possible anomalies. Its intended meaning is that, in usual operative conditions, a
computer X is down if and only if there is no path in N connecting s to X only going through computers
that are up. Thus, it is sufficient that any such path exists to have X be supposedly observed up. Armed with
this knowledge, the agent is interested in singling out the observations that are anomalous according to the
“normal” behavior of the system, modelled by P rlsN .
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Assume now that, for instance, P obsN comprises the facts {down(a), up(b), down(c), up(d),
up(e), up(f), up(g), up(h), up(t)} — in the figure, the computers observed to be down are marked in bold.
It is important to note that the program on the left of Figure 2 is stratified and, therefore, a stable model
[42] always exists no matter what observations are added to it. Thus, no conflict (in the sense of classical
inconsistency) may arise for the program P rlsN and the observations in P obsN . However, two strange things
indeed come into play with the observations.
First, down(a) comes true in P obsN , which is not predicted by P rlsN . This observation may be clearly
viewed as “unexpected” according to the background knowledge, even though it formally does not lead to an
inconsistency. However, we do not have any argument for classifying it as a wrong observation. Indeed, this
kind of disagreement may actually have happened for several reasons, for instance, because the background
knowledge just encodes a partial description of the world and the observations involve some aspects which
are not dealt with therein. E.g., the background knowledge may not encode the fact that a computer may be
down also if some internal failure occurred, which does not depend on connectivity in the network.
In addition, there is a second strange aspect in the observations, which is the fact of c also being down.
In this second case, however, the abnormality of this circumstance is also witnessed by some other observa-
tions. Specifically, if A did not observe that computers d, e, f, g, and t are up, it would have inferred exactly
the opposite conclusions (that are that d, e, f, g, and t are down) by exploiting its background knowledge,
since the failure of c suffices for breaking the s-t connectivity. Thus, in this second case, there is some
further evidence that the observation down(c) is wrong. It follows that without any additional knowledge
about the system, by reasoning this way and given the support of the observations on computers d, e, f, g,
and t, a quite reliable diagnosis can be made.
In the framework that follows, the computer c being down is precisely recognized to represent an outlier,
while the setW is an outlier witness, i.e., a set of facts which can be indeed explained by the rule component
if and only if the outliers are not trusted in the observations. ⊳
1.3 Comparison with Other Reasoning Tasks
In the light of the informal discussion and of the examples presented so far, one may wonder what kinds of
connection outlier detection has with other well-known reasoning tasks. In particular, it should be evident
that outlier detection shares some features with some well-known and studied problems in AI literature, such
as belief revision and diagnosis. Outlier detection can be indeed abstractly seen as a form of revision since
its ultimate goal is to logically harmonize the background theory with the observations to hand. Moreover,
it can be also perceived as a form of diagnosis, because the main interest is in individuals that do not behave
as predicted from the background knowledge.
Next the relationships with both belief revision and diagnosis are discussed. Specifically, given that
diagnosis cames in different forms in the literature, two of the main approaches pursued in the AI community
(cf. [72]) will be focused on, that are consistency-based and abductive diagnosis.
(Consistency-Based) Diagnosis. Diagnosis can be defined as the problem of finding what is wrong with
some possibly malfunctioning systems based on knowledge about the design of that system and observations
about its actual behavior (cf. [72, 71]).
In the consistency-based approach to diagnosis, there is no knowledge as to how malfunctioning occurs
and manifests itself, and only the “normal” behavior is axiomatized [43, 26, 76]. Therefore, diagnosis con-
sists in isolating components that are not consistent with all other components acting normally. Formally,
there is a set H of hypothesis (which in most of the formalizations comes in the form of abnormality-
defining predicates), a background theory T , and a set O of observations; then, the problem is to single out a
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set ∆ ⊆ H so that T ∪O ∪∆ is consistent in the classical sense. For instance, in [76], a hypothesis ¬ab(C)
is introduced for each component C that can possibly be faulty, and what follows from the assumptions of
normality is cast into rules.
It appears that consistency-based diagnosis has a relationship with outlier detection as long as in both
forms of reasoning one is interested in singling out “abnormality” in the knowledge at hand. However, the
framework of outlier detection does not actually fit the diagnosis framework. First, there is an important
difference in the encoding, in that, in outlier detection the background theory is not required to explicitly
account for abnormal predicates and, more importantly, outliers are not required to be conflicting (in a
logical sense) with the background theory, as evidenced in the previous examples.
Actually, one may be interested in assessing some more structural differences between these forms of
reasoning, by assuming that these syntactic issues can be faced by means of some suitable rewriting. For
instance, one can assume that the background knowledge at hand may be revised in order to explicitly
model the occurrence of anomalous observations, e.g., by means of integrity constraints. Even though there
are no immediate translation mechanisms between the two frameworks in general — the translation in fact
depends on the semantics of the application — this may be particularly simple in some situations, such as
in our network example, where the encoding of the knowledge (that currently prevents up(X) and down(X)
from being both true) might be changed by adding a constraint ← up(X), down(X).
Then, it can be assumed that all the observations constitute the hypothesis for the problem, so that by
consistency-based diagnosis bunches of observations conflicting with the theory can be singled out. How-
ever, at this point, the differences between the two frameworks emerge more clearly; indeed, the problem of
outlier detection is not yet reduced to finding such observations that somehow “contradict” the background
knowledge, because there are observations that, though different from what prescribed by the background
theory, are not outliers. This has been made evident in Example 3 above. Indeed, after a proper encoding
stating that whenever reachable, a computer must be up, one could derive that the observations down(a) and
down(c) are both faulty. However, it has already been noticed that down(a) cannot indeed be considered
an outlier because there are no other observations supporting this claim. Conversely, down(c) is an outlier,
given that there are five observations (namely, up(d), up(e), up(f), up(g), and up(t)) that support the fact
that c is up.
From this perspective, outliers might abstractly be seen as faulty observations in some kinds of diagnosis
whose reliability is further evidenced by the witness set, which would also have been considered faulty in
the case where outliers are not thrown out. This extra criterion is responsible for greater reliability of such
diagnosis, since the anomalies are not just inferred from the background knowledge (which can be in fact
incomplete and lead to misclassifications, as it would be for down(a)), but are further evidenced by the data
in itself.
Abduction and Diagnosis. In the abductive approach to diagnosis [58, 59, 18] there is a description of the
system to be diagnosed, observations (symptoms), and possible reasons (faults) for the observations. The
aim is to single out faults that may be the actual cause for the symptoms to hand. Formally, again the sets H ,
T and O are given, and a subset ∆ ⊆ H is sought that combined with T entails O. Intuitively, observations
in O are assumed to be trustable, while the hypothesis may be revised.
Abduction was studied by Pierce [69]. Since then, it has been widely recognized as an important prin-
ciple for common-sense reasoning, a powerful mechanisms for hypothetical reasoning in the presence of
incomplete information, and a solid framework for modelling practical applications. Abduction has been
also investigated in logic programming (see, e.g., [27] and the references therein). In this context, the most
influential definition is due to Kakas and Mancarella [52], but several other approaches have been also pro-
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posed both from proof and model-theoretic perspectives (e.g, [64, 22, 53, 28, 31]). Moreover, extensions to
settings where preferences are exploited while finding explanation (abduction with penalization) have been
studied for both classical logics [30] and logic programming [70].
While trying to encode outlier detection in terms of abduction, the main problem is that in the former
setting there is no explicit distinction between trustable observations and revisable hypothesis. Specifically,
all the observations are revisable, i.e., they may be faulty, and it is not known in advance which of them
should be granted, i.e., the set O is generally unknown. Therefore, the translations appear to be even less
immediate than for consistency-based approaches.
One possibility to build the translation might be to exploit the fact that in outlier detection it is known
that singling out an outlier has the effect of justifying the witness set, which can be eventually seen as the set
of trustable observations. Therefore, if this witness set, say W , was known in advance, the problem might
be encoded in a standard abduction framework by assuming all the observations butW to be revisable; then,
explanations for W are in fact outliers. However, since W is in general not known, some efforts must be
dedicated to discover it.
Again, the activity of identifying the witness sets constitutes the main source of computational complex-
ity in outlier detection problems as well as their main distinguishing characteristics with respect to abductive
problems.
Belief Revision. In such scenarios where an agent background theory mismatches with a set of observations,
it is important to revise the background knowledge, say T , by incorporating that new evidence O gained
about the world. This process is generally known as belief change in the literature, and represents an active
area of research in both Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence.
One of the best known theories of rational belief change is the AGM theory of belief revision originated
by Alchourro´n, Ga¨erdenfors, and Makinson [4] and further developed by Ga¨erdenfors [39] and Alchourro´n
and Makinson [5, 6]. Whenever O is consistent with T , the revision of T according to O, denoted by T ∗O,
is the set of all the logical consequences of T ∪{O}, denoted by T +O. Otherwise, i.e., if O is not consistent
with T , T ∗O is defined as (T−¬O)+O, where T −¬O is the contraction of T according to ¬O, that is the
set of all maximal subsets of T not entailing ¬O. This approach is the core of AGM theory, which eventually
exploits a set of postulates whose aim is to characterize the intuition of minimal change. A number of authors
have favored the postulation approach, and subsequent works concerned extensions and refinements of the
basic paradigm, namely the distinction between belief revision and belief update, work on iterated belief
revision, and the use of epistemic states [54, 36, 37, 25].
A criticism raised about the basic paradigm concerns the success postulate, i.e., the assertion that the
agent believes the most recent thing he learns. Specifically, [13] noticed that this postulate is undesirable
in the case when an agent observation may be itself imprecise or noisy (which is precisely the case we are
interested in studying in the outlier detection framework), and proposed a model of belief revision under
no obligation to incorporate observed propositions into the current belief set. Contextually, different mod-
els of non-prioritized belief change have been proposed in which no absolute priority is assigned to the
new information due to its novelty [47]. These approaches can be grouped into three main categories: de-
cision+revision, integrated choice, and expansion+consolidation. Decision+revision approaches first decide
whether to accept or reject input O, and if the input is accepted, some of the beliefs in T are given up in
order to incorporate O while retaining consistency. For example, screened revision [66] introduces a set A of
core beliefs that are kept immune from revision, and the belief set is revised only if O is consistent with the
set A ∩ T . Integrated choice approaches perform the two above-mentioned steps simultaneously. This can
be achieved by means of such choice mechanisms as epistemic entrenchment [39] or spheres-based revision
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[44]. Finally, expansion+consolidation approaches add O to the belief set T , and then make the belief state
consistent by deleting either (part of) O or some original beliefs [46].
Clearly, the problem of outlier detection is related with such approaches to belief revision, given that
its ultimate aim is to remove some kind of disagreement between the rule component and the observations.
Specifically, since in the outlier detection setting observations are to be doubted, while taking the background
knowledge for granted, two policies might be adopted in order to obtain outlier detection by revision: either
a model of non-prioritized belief change might be directly exploited, or the roles of background knowledge
and observations in the revision can be supposedly inverted, so that observations constitute the “initial”
knowledge base and the background knowledge is used to revise it; then, the success postulate guarantees
that the background theory remains unchanged and only observations are possibly given up.
However, both the above solutions strongly rely on the fact that a revision has to be made as soon as
merging observations with the theory to hand leads to inconsistencies, which is in fact the starting point
of any kind of belief revision. But this is not the case for outlier detection problems, where the notion
of inconsistency (in the classical sense) plays no role and where the mismatch is given by a rather subtle
form of disagreement between some observations and the other data at hand. Therefore, as in the case of
consistency-based diagnosis, a preliminary step for carrying out outlier detection via revision is to encode
the rule component in a way that explicitly accounts for the isolation of conflicts; but, this is not going to be
obvious in all the circumstances.
However, the most important difficulty in the encoding lies again in the additional requirement for an
outlier to be witnessed by some other set of observations. In this respect, outlier detection might be accom-
modated in a framework for computing some kinds of preferred revision, in order to avoid the revision of
observations that are not outliers, as it would occur in Example 3 with the observation down(a). To this aim,
if a witness set W had been known in advance, one would have been able to define an encoding leading to
an inconsistency whenever W would not be entailed by the theory, so that the role of the revision would
have been precisely to single out outliers having W as a witness set. Therefore, again, isolating the witness
sets appears to be a distinguishing characteristic of outlier detection problems.
1.4 Contribution and Plan of the Paper
It is worth pointing out that outlier detection problems come in several different guises within settings that
have been mainly investigated in the area of Knowledge Discovery in Databases and, recently, they have
also emerged as a knowledge representation and reasoning problems, in the context of default logic [7] —
refer to Section 7 for a thorough analysis of related literature.
In this paper, the definition provided in [7] is basically followed for identifying anomalies in observa-
tions, but the concept of outliers is formally stated in the context of logic programming under the stable
model semantics for several reasons. Firstly, logic programs have been, in fact, proved to be a powerful
tool for modelling reasoning capabilities in multi-agent systems [45, 85, 83]. Secondly, outlier detection
problems formalized using the logic programming paradigm have a natural translation into standard logic
inference problems, thus making the framework presented here quite easily implemented on top of any ef-
ficient inference engine (such as GnT [49], DLV [61], Smodels [67], and ASSAT [63]). Thirdly, the new
formalization of outlier detection presented here is better suited as the basis for generalizing the outlier
detection problems formalized in [7]. In more detail, the contributions of this paper are summarized below.
✄ The notion of outlier in the context of logic programming-based Knowledge systems is formally defined.
In particular, the definition introduced in [7] is generalized by allowing an outlier to consist of a set
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brave / cautious EXISTENCE WITNESS−CHECKING OUTLIER−CHECKING OW−CHECKING COMPUTATION
General Logic Program ΣP2 -complete ΣP2 / DP -complete ΣP2 -complete DP -complete FΣP2 -complete
Stratified Logic Program NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete P-complete FNP-complete
Fig. 3. Basic Results for outlier detection problems.
brave ≡ cautious EXISTENCE[k] WITNESS−CHECKING[k] OW−CHECKING[min] COMPUTATION[min]
General Logic Program ΣP2 -complete DP -complete ΠP2 -complete F∆P3 [O(log n)]
Stratified Logic Program NP-complete P-complete co-NP-complete FNP//OptP[O(log n)]-complete
Fig. 4. Complexity of Minimum-size Outlier Detection Problems.
of observations (modelled as ground facts) rather than of a single observation. This generalization is
significant because there are actual situations where only non-singleton outliers can be detected.
✄ Outlier detection problems are investigated in the context of skeptical semantics (the only one considered
in [7]) as well as in the context of brave semantics. It should be noted that this does not simply add some
formal details to the framework, since from the semantical viewpoint, referring to brave or skeptical
reasoning in detection problems significantly changes the role that is played by outliers.
✄ The computational complexity of some natural decision outlier detection problems is thoroughly investi-
gated for the case of propositional logic programs. The results of this study (both for brave and cautious
reasoning) are summarized in Figure 3. It can be noted that the complexity figures range from P to ΣP2
depending on the specific detection problem considered. It is also worth pointing out that, differently
from what happens with most logic-based reasoning frameworks, in most of cases considered brave and
cautious semantics induce the same complexity. Furthermore, the complexity of computing outliers is
analyzed.
✄ The data complexity of some basic outlier detection problems is investigated. This analysis is particu-
larly useful in the context of outlier detection in database applications, where one is usually interested
in understanding how the complexity of a problem varies as a function of the database size, and the
rule component is assumed to held fixed, or anyway less frequently varied, as it usually encodes a set
of constraints on the database schema. Hence, in the data complexity scenario, other than continuing
investigating propositional programs, also non-ground logic programs are considered.
✄ Several cost-based generalizations of outlier detection problems are formalized, accounting for a num-
ber of interesting situations in which the computation of just any outlier is not what is really sought.
Moreover, how this generalization influences the complexity of outlier detection is also studied — see
Figure 4.
✄ The basic outlier detection framework assumes that observations (and, hence, outliers) come into play
as sets of facts encoding some aspects of the current status of the world. However, there are situations
where it would be desirable to have observations encoded as a logical theory (this might be required, for
instance, for agents to be able to reconstruct an internal and possibly complex description of the outer
environment by learning logical rules and then reasoning on the basis of them, e.g., about the behaviors
of other agents). To this aim the concept of outlier is extended to be denoted, in general, by a set of
logical rules and facts. The computational complexity of the problems arising in this extended setting is
also accounted for in the paper.
✄ In order to ease fast prototyping of outlier-based reasoning frameworks, sound and complete algorithms
for transforming any outlier problem into an equivalent inference problem under stable model semantics
are presented. The transformations can thus be used for effectively implementing outlier detection on
top of any available stable model solver (e.g., [49, 61, 67, 63]).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries on logic programs
and on the main complexity classes dealt with in the paper. The basic definition of outliers under both
brave and cautious semantics is introduced in Section 3, where the complexity of some outlier detection
problems is also investigated. Section 4 proposes a generalization of the basic framework in which minimum
size-outliers are sought, and studies how this additional requirement influences the basic difficulty of the
detection problems. A different kind of extension, that is, the possibility of having observations encoded
as logic theories is discussed in Section 5. Then, Section 6 illustrates a sound and complete rewriting for
implementing outlier detection on top of stable model engines. Finally, Section 7 discusses some related
work and, in Section 8, conclusions are drawn.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Logic Programs
A term is a constant or a variable. An atom is of the form p(t1, ..., tk) where p is a k-ary predicate symbol
and t1, ..., tk are terms; in the case k = 0, the atom is called propositional letter and parenthesis are omitted.
A literal is an atom a or its negation not a.
A rule r is a syntactic clause of the form: a ← b1, · · · , bk, not c1, · · · , not cn., where k, n ≥ 0, and
a, b1, · · · , bk, c1, · · · , cn are atoms. The atom a, also denoted by h(r), is the head of r, while the conjunction
b1, . . . , bk, not c1, · · · , not cn, also denoted by b(r), is the body of r. A rule with n = 0 is called positive.
A rule with an empty body (i.e. n = k = 0) is called a fact (← is omitted).
A logic program (short: LP) P is a finite set of rules. P is positive if all the rules are positive. P is
stratified, if there is an assignment s(·) of integers to the predicate symbols in P such that for each rule r
in P the following holds: if p is the atom in the head of r and q (resp. not q) occurs in r, then s(p) ≥ s(q)
(resp. s(p) > s(q)). Moreover, P is propositional if all the atoms in it are propositional letters.
The Herbrand Universe UP of a program P is the set of all constants appearing in P , and its Herbrand
Base BP is the set of all ground atoms constructed from the predicates appearing in P and the constants
from UP . A ground term (resp. an atom, a literal, a rule or a program) is a term (resp. an atom, a literal, a
rule or a program) where no variables occur. A rule r′ is a ground instance of a rule r, if r′ can be obtained
from r by consistently replacing variables occurring in r with constants in UP . By ground(P ) the set of all
ground instances of the rules in P is denoted.
In the following, background knowledge bases encoded by means of ground programs, or, equivalently,
by means of propositional logic programs4 are (mainly) considered. While this is a rather natural setting
most often adopted in the literature for introducing and discussing the complexity of various basic reasoning
tasks, it is relevant to note that the proposed outlier detection framework is general enough to cope with rule
components encoded also by means of non-ground programs (the reader may check that no modification
at all is required in the basic definitions). This is, for instance, the case of our running examples, where
the use of variables has been pursued to keep the encoding compact and to help the reader’s intuition in
understanding the main features of outlier detection problems. Clearly, in these cases, as far as complexity
studies are concerned, given a logic program P with variables, the input to our reasoning tasks is to be
understood as its ground version ground(P ). Notably, the semantics of a program P is in fact precisely
defined in terms of its ground version, as discussed below.
4 Indeed, any ground program P may be equivalently seen as a propositional one, by replacing each atom of the form p(t1, ..., tk)
where each ti (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is a constant, with the propositional letter pt1,...,tk .
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An interpretation of P is any subset of BP . The truth value of a ground atom L w.r.t. an interpretation I ,
denoted valueI(L), is 1 (true) if L ∈ I and 0 (false) otherwise. The value of a ground negated literal not L
is 1 − valueI(L). The truth value of a conjunction of ground literals C = L1, . . . , Ln is the minimum over
the values of the Li, i.e. valueI(C) = min({valueI(Li) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}). If n = 0, then valueI(C) = true.
A ground rule r is satisfied by I if valueI(h(r)) ≥ valueI(b(r)). Thus, a rule r with empty body is
satisfied by I if valueI(h(r)) = true. An interpretation M for P is a model of P if M satisfies all rules in
ground(P ).
The minimal model semantics assigns to a positive program P its unique minimal model MM(P ). A
model M for P is minimal if no proper subset of M is a model for P . For a general program P , the stable
model semantics [41] assigns to P the set SM(P ) of its stable models defined as follows. Let P be a logic
program and let I be an interpretation for P . Then, the reduct of P w.r.t I , denoted by P I , is the ground
positive program derived from ground(P ) by (1) removing all rules that contain a negative literal not a in
the body and a ∈ I , and (2) removing all negative literals from the remaining rules. An interpretation M is a
stable model for P if and only if M =MM(PM ). It is well known that stable models are minimal models
and that stratified logic programs have a unique stable model (see, e.g., [24]).
Let W be a set of facts. Then, program P bravely entails W (resp. ¬W), denoted by P |=b W (resp.
P |=b ¬W), if there exists M ∈ SM(P ) such that each fact in W is evaluated true (resp. false) in M .
Conversely, P cautiously entails W (resp. ¬W), denoted by P |=c W (resp. P |=c ¬W), if for each model
M ∈ SM(P ), each fact in W is true (resp. false) in M . Clearly, for a positive or stratified program P ,
P |=c W iff P |=b W .
2.2 Computational Complexity
Some basic definitions about complexity theory are recalled next. The reader is referred to [68, 50] for more
on this.
Decision problems are maps from strings (encoding the input instance over a suitable alphabet) to the
set {“yes”, “no”}. A (possibly nondeterministic) Turing machine M answers a decision problem if on a
given input x, (i) a branch of M halts in an accepting state iff x is a “yes” instance, and (ii) all the branches
of M halt in some rejecting state iff x is a “no”instance.
The class P is the set of decision problems that can be answered by a deterministic Turing machine
in polynomial time. The classes ΣPk and ΠPk , forming the polynomial hierarchy, are defined as follows:
ΣP0 = Π
P
0 = P and for all k ≥ 1, ΣPk = NP
ΣP
k−1 , ∆Pk = P
ΣP
k−1 , and ΠPk = co-ΣPk where co-ΣPk
denotes the class of problems whose complementary version is solvable in ΣPk , and where ΣPk (resp. ∆Pk )
models computability by a nondeterministic (resp. deterministic) polynomial-time Turing machine which
may use an oracle that is, loosely speaking, a subprogram, that can be run with no computational cost, for
solving a problem in ΣPk−1. The class ΣP1 of decision problems that can be solved by a nondeterministic
Turing machine in polynomial time is also denoted by NP, while the class ΠP1 of decision problems whose
complementary problem is in NP, is denoted by co-NP. The class DPk , k ≥ 1, is the class of problems
defined as a conjunction of two independent problems, one from ΣPk and one from ΠPk , respectively. Note
that, for all k ≥ 1, ΣPk ⊆ DPk ⊆ ΣPk+1.
Functions (also computation problems) are (partial) maps from strings to strings, which can be computed
by suitable Turing machines, called transducers, that have an output tape. In particular, a transducer T
computes a string y on input x, if some branch of the computation of T on x halts in an accepting state and,
in that state, y is on the output tape of T . Thus, a function f is computed by T , if (i) T computes y on input
x iff f(x) = y, and (ii) all the branches of T halt in some rejecting state iff f(x) is undefined.
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In this paper, some classes of computation problems will be referred to which are illustrated next (see,
also, [57, 79]). The class FP is the set of all the polynomial time computable functions, which are functions
computed by polynomial-time bounded deterministic transducers. More generally, for each class of decision
problems, say C, FC denotes its functional version; for instance, FNP denotes the class of functions com-
puted by nondeterministic transducers in polynomial time, FΣP2 denotes the class of functions computed in
polynomial time by nondeterministic transducers which use an NP oracle, and F∆P2 denotes the functions
computed, in polynomial time, by a deterministic transducer which uses an NP oracle. In the following some
further classes will also be referred to, which will be defined when needed.
In conclusion, the notion of reduction for decision and computation problems should be recalled. A
decision problem A1 is polynomially reducible to a decision problem A2 if there is a polynomial time
computable function h such that for every x, h(x) is defined and A1 output “yes” on input x iff A2 outputs
“yes” on input h(x). A decision problem A is complete for the class C of the polynomial hierarchy iff A
belongs to C and every problem in C is polynomially reducible to A. Moreover, a function f1 is reducible to
a function f2 if there is a pair of polynomial-time computable functions h1, h2 such that, for every x, h1(x)
is defined, and f1(x) = h2(x,w) where w = f2(h1(x)). A function f is hard for a class of functions FC, if
every f ′ ∈ F is polynomially reducible to f , and is complete for FC, if it is hard for FC and belongs to FC.
3 Defining Outliers
In this section, the notions and the basic definitions involved in our framework are introduced and the main
problems studied in the paper are described and formalized.
3.1 Formal Framework
Let P rls be a logic program encoding general knowledge about the world, called rule component, and let
P obs be a set of facts encoding some observed aspects of the current status of the world, called observation
component. Then, the structure P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, relating the general knowledge encoded in P rls with the
evidence about the world encoded in P obs, is a rule-observation pair, and it constitutes the input for outlier
detection problems.
Indeed, given P, it is interesting to identify (if there is one) a set O of observations (facts in P obs)
that are “anomalous” according to the general theory P rls and the other facts in P obs \ O. Quite roughly
speaking, the idea underlying the identification of O is to discover a witness set W ⊆ P obs, that is, a set
of facts which would be explained in the theory if and only if all the facts in O were not observed. This
intuition is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Outlier). Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair and let O ⊆ P obs be a set facts.
Then, O is an outlier in P if there is a non-empty set W ⊆ P obs with W∩O = ∅, called outlier witness for
O in P, such that:
1. P (P)W |= ¬W , and
2. P (P)W ,O 6|= ¬W
where P (P) = P rls ∪ P obs, P (P)W = P (P) \ W , P (P)W ,O = P (P)W \ O, and |= denotes entailment
under either cautious semantics (|=c) or brave semantics (|=b). ✷
As an example application of the definition above, let us consider again the network of Example 3.
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Example 4. Let us consider the rule-observation pair PN = 〈P rlsN , P obsN 〉, where the program P rlsN
consists of the rules shown on the left of Figure 2, and P obsN comprises the observed facts
{down(a), up(b), down(c), up(d), up(e), up(f), up(g), up(h), up(t)}.
Let W be the set {up(d), up(e), up(g), up(f), up(t)} and O = {down(c)}. Then, it is easy to see that
P (PN )W |=b ¬W and P (PN )W ,O 6|=b ¬W . Therefore, {down(c)} is an outlier in PN , and W is an outlier
witness for O in PN (under the brave semantics). Actually, since the program is stratified and there is
exactly one stable model, it is the case that {down(c)} is an outlier and W its witness also under cautious
semantics. ⊳
Let us now take a closer look at Definition 1. First, it is worthwhile noting that the definition is a
generalization of the one proposed in [7], since an outlier is not constrained to be a literal, but it might
consists of several individual facts. Accordingly, it was explicitly required that outliers must not overlap
with their witness sets, in order to avoid situations where a set of facts supports by itself its anomaly.
As an example of such a situation, consider the rule-observation pair P0 = 〈P rls0 , P obs0 〉, where P rls0 =
{a← b. b← not c.} and P obs0 = {a, b, c}. Consider also the sets O0 = {b, c} and W0 = {a, b}.
Clearly, O0 and W0 satisfy both conditions (1) and (2) in Definition 1, but they are not considered to be
an outlier and its associated witness, respectively, because they are not disjoint. The problem here is that
b appears to be an outlier only if this is witnessed by b itself — it is easy to check that W ′0 = {a} is
not a witness for O0. Note that, situations such as the one described above cannot occur when outliers
are singleton sets (cf. [7]) for which disjointness between an outlier and its associated witness is trivially
guaranteed in order to satisfy condition (2) in Definition 1.
The second important feature accounted for in Definition 1 is the possibility of dealing with the two
different semantics that are commonly adopted in the logic programming framework, which are, brave and
the cautious semantics. Indeed, the semantics is assumed to be part of the input in the problem of outlier
detection, and it is therefore fixed after a suitable entailment operator |= in the set {|=b, |=c} is selected.
After this choice was made by the designer of the rule component, the process of singling out outliers will
be carried out consistently. Obviously, if the program has a unique stable model (for instance, in the case
it is positive or stratified as in Example 4), then brave and cautious semantics coincide. For this reason, in
the rest of the paper, for stratified or positive programs there is no distinction among the semantics - for
instance, it will be said simply that P entails a set W .
However, next is shown that in some scenarios one notion of entailment appears to be more appropriate
with respect to the other, as discussed in the following two paragraphs.
Cautious Semantics. Let us consider again Example 2, and let us denote by P obsDB the set of facts shown in
Figure 1, and by P rlsDB the rule component including just the following rule:
Approved(L)← ReqLoan(L, C, A), A > 50.000, Endorsement(L, P), not Unreliable(P).
Let PDB be the rule-observation pair = 〈P rlsDB , P obsDB〉, and observe that the set {Unreliable(p1)} is an
outlier in PDB whose witness is {Approved(l1)}.
Assume now that the database is updated with some new data that the Bank has collected by integrating
several distributed local databases into a unique datawharehouse, and let P¯ obsDB be such a modified database.
Data stored in different sources are not required to satisfy integrity constraints issued on the Bank schema.
Therefore, after the integration is carried out, it might happen that some integrity constraints are violated.
Specifically, assume for instance that the first two attributes of REQLOAN are in fact a key for the relation,
and that the tuple REQLOAN(l1,c1,10.000) is added to P¯ obsDB in the integration process, so that a conflict with
REQLOAN(l1,c1,57.000) occurs.
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The standard approach in the literature for facing the presence of inconsistencies with respect to in-
tegrity constraints is to carry out some “repair” of the data [9], i.e., to identify a suitable (minimal) set
of deletion/addition of facts in the database that restore the system to a consistent state. For instance,
in our example, there are two possible ways for repairing the database, that are either deleting the tuple
REQLOAN(l1,c1,10.000) or deleting the tuple REQLOAN(l1,c1,57.000) — let R1 and R2 be the two repairs
that are computed according to such modifications. Then, whenever a query is issued over the repaired
database, only consistent answers are retrieved, i.e., answers that are evaluated true with respect to all the
possible repairs. In fact, several data integration systems supporting consistent query answering have already
been proposed in the literature [38, 62, 20], which exploit a suitable encoding in terms of logic programs that
ensures a one-to-one correspondence between stable models and repairs for the system.
As an example, the repair approach can be encoded by means of the program P¯ rlsDB defined as follows:
ReqLoan′(L, C, A)← ReqLoan(L, C, A), ReqLoan(L, C, A1), A 6= A1, not ReqLoan′(L, C, A1).
Approved(L)← ReqLoan′(L, C, A), A > 50.000, Endorsement(L, P), not Unreliable(P).
where the first rule takes care of the key on ReqLoan (in particular, it ensures that the primed relation do not
violate the key on REQLOAN), and the second rule is the rewriting of the original rule-component.
Then, stable models for the program P¯ rlsDB ∪ P¯ obsDB are in one-to-one correspondence with repairs of
the data integration system, and therefore consistent query answering coincides with cautious reason-
ing over the encoding, which is more appropriate than brave reasoning for data integration tasks. Ac-
cordingly, letting P¯DB = 〈P¯ rlsDB , P¯ obsDB〉, we have that P (P¯DB){Approved(l1 )} |=c ¬Approved(l1 ), since
in both the repairs R1 and R2, Approved(l1 ) cannot be entailed because p1 is unreliable. Moreover,
P (P¯DB){Approved(l1 )},{Unreliable(p1 )} does not cautiously entail ¬Approved(l1 ). Indeed, at one hand,
according to repair R2, i.e., by deleting REQLOAN(l1,c1,57.000), there is no need at all for deriving
Approved(l1 ) since the loan does no longer require any approval. However, at the other hand, accord-
ing to repair R1, i.e., by deleting REQLOAN(l1,c1,10.000), Approved(l1 ) can be entailed given that
Unreliable(p1 ) is being doubted about. Thus, we cannot be completely sure that ¬Approved(l1 ) is
entailed by the program P (P¯DB){Approved(l1 )},{Unreliable(p1 )} and, therefore, {Unreliable(p1 )} and
{Approved(l1 )} represent an outlier and its associated witness under the cautious semantics.
Brave Semantics. Let us focus again on Example 3, and consider a slight modification of the encoding in
P rlsN , where the following rules have been added:
r7 : wired(c
′, X)← wired(c, X).
r8 : wired(X, c
′)← wired(X, c).
r9 : computer(c
′).
r10 : down(c
′)← internalFailure(c′).
r11 : internalFailure(c
′)← computer(c′), not properlyWorking(c′).
r12 : properlyWorking(c
′)← computer(c′), not internalFailure(c′).
encoding the fact that another computer c′ with the same connections as c is added to the network and that
c′ is an old piece of hardware that is known to be subject to possibly internal faults (rules r10...r12).
Let P¯ rlsN be such a modified rule-component, and let P¯N = 〈P¯ rlsN , P obsN 〉, i.e., assume that the same set
of observations of Example 3 has been obtained by agent A, which therefore has no knowledge about the
current status of c′.
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Clearly, P (P¯N ) has two possible models, corresponding to the situation in which c′ is either up or down.
In order to single out any possible anomalous situations brave semantics should be adopted, in this case. This
is also often assumed in most diagnostic approaches.
Let W be the set {up(d), up(e), up(g), up(f), up(t)} and O = {down(c)}. Then, it is easy to see that
P (P¯N )W |=b ¬W; indeed, in the case c′ is down, none of d, e, f, g, and t can be up. Thus, condition (1) in
Definition 1 is satisfied. As for condition (2), it is easy to see that P (P¯N )W ,O 6|=b ¬W . Indeed, if down(c)
is not trusted, then all the computers in d, e, f, g, and t will be entailed to be up, no matter what the status of
c′ is. Thus, under the brave semantics, down(c) remains an outlier in this modified scenario. It is worthwhile
noting that according to the cautious semantics, instead, ¬W is not entailed by P (P¯N )W , given that there is
a model (where c′ is up) in which nothing anomalous can be singled out in these observations in W .
Therefore, brave semantics appears to be quite useful in this kind of diagnostic scenario for it allows
the identification of all the situations which are possibly anomalous rather than focusing only on absolutely
reliable ones.
So, there are scenarios where one of the either forms of reasoning is suitably applied. It is therefore
natural to ask whether there are some particular relationships between the two notions. This section is
concluded by noting that this is not the case, as can be formally verified by exploiting the asymmetry of
Definition 1. Indeed, under cautious reasoning the definition is strict in requiring that for each stable model,
the witness set W is not entailed by the theory obtained by removing W itself (point 1), but then it just
requires the existence of a model explaining some facts in W after the removal of the outlier O (point 2).
Conversely, under brave semantics the definition is loose in the first point, because it requires that W is true
in at least one stable model, but, for point (2), it requires that each model of P (P)W ,O entails some facts
in W .
It turns out that the two semantics are both of interest, since, intuitively, referring to brave or skeptical
reasoning in outlier detection problems significantly changes the role that, from a computational viewpoint,
is played by literals encoding outliers — this role will be further clarified in the following sections, while
discussing the complexity of outlier detection problems. Moreover, by looking at the example above, it
even seems that the brave semantics better captures the intuition behind outlier detection in some kinds of
diagnostic application; in this respect, extending the definition in [7] to encompass both the semantics (rather
than referring to the cautious one alone) allowed us to look at outlier detection problems from a different
perspective.
3.2 Basic Results
Now that the notion of outlier has been formalized, next the study of the most basic problems arising in this
setting is addressed. The first basic problem considered here is the problem EXISTENCE defined as follows.
Given in input a rule-observation pairP = 〈P rls, P obs〉, EXISTENCE is the problem of deciding the existence
of an outlier in P. Clearly, the complexity of EXISTENCE strictly depends on what kind of logic program
P rls is. A very simple case is where P rls is a positive logic program.
Theorem 1. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair such that P rls is positive. Then, there are no
outliers in P.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that there is an outlier O ⊆ P obs with witness W ⊆ P obs in P. Let P ′
denote the logic program P (P)W ,O . Notice that P ′ has a unique model, say M . From condition (2) in
Definition 1 it is known that P ′ 6|= ¬W . Hence, it can be inferred that there is w ∈ W such that w ∈M , i.e.
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that P ′ |= w. Thus, it also holds, for the monotonicity property, that P ′ ∪ O |= w, i.e. that P (P)W 6|= ¬W
and thus W is not a witness, since it would violate condition (1) in Definition 1. ✷
Let us now consider a more involved scenario, in which P rls is stratified. Even though in logic program-
ming adding stratified negation does not increase the complexity of identifying the unique minimal model
with respect to the negation-free case, it is next shown that negation (even in the stratified form) does indeed
matter in the context of outlier detection. Indeed, the EXISTENCE problem becomes more difficult in this
case, and even unlikely to be solvable in polynomial time.
Before proving the results, some basic definitions are introduced that will be used in the proofs. Let L
be a set of literals. Then, it is denoted by L+ the set {p | p is a positive literal in L}, and by L− the set
{p | ¬p is a negative literal in L}. Let L be a consistent set of literals. By σL the truth assignment on the
set of letters occurring in L is denoted such that, for each literal p ∈ L+, σL(p) = true, and for each
literal ¬p ∈ L−, σL(p) = false. Let σ be a truth assignment of the set {x1, . . . , xn} of boolean variables.
Then, it is denoted by Lit(σ) the set of literals {ℓ1, . . . , ℓn}, such that ℓi is xi if σ(xi) = true and is ¬xi
if σ(xi) = false, for i = 1, . . . , n. Let ℓ be a literal. Then, it is denoted by ρ(ℓ) the expression ℓ, if ℓ is
positive, and the expression not ℓ′, if ℓ is negative and ℓ = ¬ℓ′.
Theorem 2. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair such that P rls is stratified. Then, EXISTENCE
is NP-complete.
Proof. (Membership) Given a rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, it must be shown that there are two
sets W,O ⊆ P obs such that P (P)W |= ¬W (query q′) and P (P)W ,O 6|= ¬W (query q′′). P (P) is stratified
and, hence, has a unique stable model. Moreover, both query q′ and q′′ are P-complete (see, e.g., [24]).
Thus, a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine can be built solving EXISTENCE as follows: the
machine guesses both the sets W and O and then solves queries q′ and q′′ in polynomial time.
(Hardness) Recall that deciding whether a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form Φ = c1∧. . .∧cm
over the variables x1, . . . , xn is satisfiable, i.e., deciding whether there are truth assignments to the variables
making each clause cj true, is an NP-hard problem, even if each clause contains at most three distinct
(positive or negated) variables, and each variable occurs in at most three clauses [40]. Without loss of
generality, assume Φ contains at least one clause and one variable.
A rule-observation pair P(Φ) = 〈P rls(Φ), P obs(Φ)〉 is defined such that: (i) P obs(Φ) contains exactly
the fact xi for each variable xi in Φ, and the facts sat and disabled; (ii) P rls(Φ) is
cj ← ρ(tj,1), not disabled.
cj ← ρ(tj,2), not disabled.
cj ← ρ(tj,3), not disabled.

 ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m, s.t. cj = tj,1 ∨ tj,2 ∨ tj,3
sat← c1, ..., cm.
Clearly, P(Φ) is stratified and can be built in polynomial time. Now it is shown that Φ is satisfiable ⇔
there is an outlier in P(Φ).
(⇒) Suppose that Φ is satisfiable, and take one of its satisfying truth assignments, say σe, for the vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn. Let X be the set Lit(σe)−, and X ′ be a generic subset of X . It is shown that
O = {disabled} ∪ (X \ X ′) is an outlier with witness W = {sat} ∪ X ′ in P(Φ).
Indeed, the unique stable model of the program P (P(Φ))W is such that each atom cj (associated to a
clause) is false since disabled is true, since it being not removed from P obs(Φ). Hence, sat cannot be
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entailed in P (P(Φ))W ; moreover, any atom in X ′ cannot be entailed in P (P(Φ))W also (because there
is no rule suitable for the entailment) and, therefore, condition (1) in Definition 1 is satisfied. Consider,
now, the set O = {disabled} ∪ (X \ X ′). It is easy to see that an atom associated with a variable, say
xi, is false in P (P(Φ))W ,O if and only if xi ∈ X . Thus, P (P(Φ))W ,O has the effect of evaluating the
truth value of the assignment σe. Given that σe is a satisfying assignment, the unique stable model of
P (P(Φ))W ,O contains sat, thereby satisfying condition (2) in Definition 1. Hence, O is an outlier in
P(Φ), and W is a witness for it.
(⇐) Suppose that there is an outlier O in P(Φ), and let W be its associated witness set. Notice that in
order to satisfy condition (2) in Definition 1, W must contain at least a fact that can be eventually
entailed by P (Φ)W ,O. Clearly, the only fact satisfying this requirement among those in P obs(Φ) is
sat. Therefore, it must be the case that P (Φ)W ,O |= sat and, consequently, disabled is in W ∪ O,
and hence it is false in P (Φ)W ,O. Then, given that whenever disabled is false the rule component
evaluates the truth value of formula Φ, it is the case that there is a satisfying assignment σe such that
(W ∪O) ∩ {x1, . . . , xn} = Lit(σ
e)−.
Before closing the proof, note that in the ‘⇒’-part above, the task of guessing a truth assignment is
“shared” by the two sets W and O. Moreover, the existence of an outlier implies (‘⇐’-part) that Φ is
satisfiable and, eventually (from the ‘⇒’-part), that there is an outlier O having the form {disabled} ∪
(X \ X ′). Thus, the following stronger claim also holds: Φ is satisfiable ⇔ there is an outlier in P(Φ) ⇔
O = {disabled} ∪ (X \ X ′) is an outlier with witness W = {sat} ∪ X ′ in P(Φ), where X = Lit(σe)−
with σe being a truth assignment for the variables x1, . . . , xn that makes Φ true, and X ′ is a generic subset
of X . ✷
The complexity of the EXISTENCE problem in the most general setting is studied next. The following
theorem shows that, under the brave semantics, the problem for general programs lies one level up in the
polynomial hierarchy w.r.t. the complexity associated with stratified programs.
Theorem 3. EXISTENCE under the brave semantics is ΣP2 -complete.
Proof. (Membership) Given a rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, it must be shown that there are two
sets W,O ⊆ P obs such that P (P)W |=b ¬W (query q′) and P (P)W ,O 6|=b ¬W (query q′′). Query q′ is
NP-complete, while query q′′ is co-NP-complete (see, e.g., [24]). Thus, a polynomial-time nondeterministic
Turing machine can be built with a NP oracle, solving query EXISTENCE as follows: the machine guesses
both the sets W and O and then solves queries q′ and q′′ by two calls to the oracle.
(Hardness) Let Φ = ∃X∀Yf be a quantified Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form, i.e., f is a
Boolean formula of the form d1∨ . . .∨ dm, over the variables X = x1, . . . xn, and Y = y1, . . . yq. Deciding
the validity of these formulas is a well-known ΣP2 -complete problem. Without loss of generality, assume that
each disjunct dj contains three literals at most. With Φ the rule-observation pair P(Φ) = 〈P rls(Φ), P obs(Φ)〉
is associated such that: (i) P obs(Φ) contains exactly a fact xi for each variable xi in Φ, and the facts sat and
disabled; (ii) P rls(Φ) is
yi ← not bi. 1 ≤ i ≤ q
bi ← not yi. 1 ≤ i ≤ q
sat← ρ(tj,1), ρ(tj,2), ρ(tj,3), not disabled. 1 ≤ j ≤ m s.t. dj = tj,1 ∧ tj,2 ∧ tj,3
Clearly, P(Φ) can be built in polynomial time. Now it is shown that Φ is valid ⇔ there is an outlier in P(Φ).
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(⇒) Suppose that Φ is valid, and let σX be a truth value assignment for the existentially quantified vari-
ables X that makes Φ valid. Next the sets W and O are built, by exploiting the ideas of the reduc-
tion in Theorem 2: Let X be the set Lit(σX)−, and X ′ be a generic subset of X . It is shown that
O = {disabled} ∪ (X \ X ′) is an outlier with witness W = {sat} ∪ X ′ in P(Φ).
Note that, since disabled 6∈ W , the program P (P(Φ))W cannot entail sat (under any semantics);
moreover, any atom in X ′ cannot be entailed in P (P(Φ))W as well (because there is no rule suitable
for the entailment) and, therefore, condition (1) in Definition 1 is satisfied. As for condition (2) in
Definition 1, note that the stable models of the program P (P(Φ))W ,O are in one-to-one correspondence
with the truth assignments σY of the universally quantified variables. In particular, given that σX makes
the formula valid, each stable model has the form {sat}∪Lit(σX)+∪Lit(σY )+∪{bi | yi ∈ Lit(σY )
−
}.
Hence, it holds that P (P(Φ))W ,O 6|=b ¬sat.
(⇐) Suppose that there is an outlier O with witness W in P(Φ). As sat is the unique fact in P obs(Φ) that
can be derived by P (P(Φ))W ,O , then in order to satisfy condition (2) of Definition 1, it is the case
that W contains sat. Furthermore, in order to satisfy condition (1) of Definition 1, sat must be not
entailed in P (P(Φ))W . To this aim, either disabled is in W or, letting X =W ∩ {x1, . . . , xn}, for any
truth-value assignment σ({x1,...,xn}\X )∪¬X , there is no assignment for the universally quantified variables
satisfying the formula. Finally, in order to have P (P(Φ))W ,O 6|=b ¬sat, the set O is such that, letting
X ′ =(O∪W)∩{x1, . . . , xn}, then σ({x1,...,xn}\X ′)∪¬X ′ is a truth value assignment for the existentially
quantified variables X that makes Φ valid. ✷
Note that even though outlier detection on general logic programs turned out to be “intrinsically” more
complex than detection on stratified logic programs, the sources of the difficulties remain unchanged under
brave semantics. In fact, the reduction in the above theorem points out that the task of guessing a satisfying
truth assignment is still “shared” by the two sets W and O, in the same way as the reduction in Theorem 2.
Next cautious semantics is considered. Whereas, for most reasoning tasks, switching from brave to
cautious reasoning usually implies the complexity to “switch” accordingly from a certain class C to the
complementary class co-C , this is not the case for our EXISTENCE problem.
Theorem 4. EXISTENCE under the cautious semantics is ΣP2 -complete.
Proof. (Membership) Given a rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, it must be shown that there are two
sets W,O ⊆ P obs such that P (P)W |=c ¬W (query q′) and P (P)W ,O 6|=c ¬W (query q′′). Query q′ is
co-NP-complete, while query q′′ is NP-complete (see, e.g., [24]). Thus, a polynomial-time nondeterministic
Turing machine with a NP oracle can be built, solving query EXISTENCE as follows: the machine guesses
both the sets W and O and then solves queries q′ and q′′ by two calls to the oracle.
(Hardness) Let Φ = ∃X∀Yf be a quantified Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form, i.e., f is
a Boolean formula of the form D1 ∨ . . . ∨ Dm, over the variables X = x1, . . . xn, and Y = y1, . . . yq.
We associate with Φ the rule-observation pair P(Φ) = 〈P rls(Φ), P obs(Φ)〉 such that: (i) P obs(Φ) contains
exactly a fact xi for each variable xi in Φ, and the facts unsat and disabled; (ii) P rls(Φ) is
yi ← not bi. 1 ≤ i ≤ q
bi ← not yi. 1 ≤ i ≤ q
sat← ρ(tj,1), ρ(tj,2), ρ(tj,3). 1 ≤ j ≤ m s.t. Dj = tj,1 ∧ tj,2 ∧ tj,3
unsat← not sat.
unsat← not disabled.
Clearly, P(Φ) can be built in polynomial time. Now it is shown that Φ is valid ⇔ there is an outlier in
P(Φ).
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(⇒) Suppose that Φ is valid, and let σX be a truth value assignment for the existentially quantified variables
X that makes Φ valid. Consider the setW composed by the fact unsat plus all the facts associated to the
variables that are false in σX , that is the set {unsat}∪Lit(σX)−, and consider the setO composed only
by the fact disabled. Note that, the stable models of the program P (P(Φ))W are in one-to-one corre-
spondence with the truth assignments σY of the universally quantified variables. In particular, the unique
stable model MY is given by the set Lit(σX)
+
∪ Lit(σY )
+
∪ {bi | yi ∈ Lit(σ
Y )
−
} ∪ {sat, disabled}.
Indeed, since the formula is satisfied by σX , for each MY , sat ∈ MY and unsat 6∈ MY . Hence,
P (P(Φ))W |=c ¬W . Conversely, the program P (P(Φ))W ,O in which disabled is false, trivially derives
unsat. It can be concluded that O is an outlier in P(Φ), and W is a witness for it.
(⇐) Suppose that there is an outlier O with witness W in P(Φ). As unsat is the unique fact in P obs(Φ)
that can be derived by P (P(Φ))W ,O , then in order to satisfy condition (2) of Definition 1, it is the case
that W contains unsat and that P (P(Φ))W |=c ¬unsat. Furthermore, in order to satisfy condition (1)
of Definition 1, disabled does not belong to W . Thus, {unsat} ⊆ W ⊆ {unsat, x1, . . . , xn}. Let X
be the subset W \ {unsat} and let σX be the truth value assignment σ({x1,...,xn}\X )∪¬X to the set of
variables X. Clearly, P (P(Φ))W |=c ({x1, . . . , xn} \ X ) ∪ ¬X . As P (P(Φ))W |=c ¬unsat, then it
is the case that for each subset Y of Y, the stable model MY of P (P(Φ))W associated with Y , that is
the model MY containing Y and no other fact from Y, is such that sat ∈ MY . That is, for each truth
value assignment σY to the variables in the set Y , there is at least a disjunct such that σX ◦ σY makes
the formula f true. As a consequence, Φ is valid. To conclude the proof, note that O = {disabled} is
always an outlier having such a witness. ✷
It should be pointed out in conclusion that even though the complexity of the EXISTENCE problem turned
out to be the same for both brave and cautious semantics, the nature of the problems are still quite different.
In fact, the proof of the above theorem shows that under cautious semantics the witness is alone responsi-
ble for guessing the whole satisfying assignment. Conversely, it has already been noticed that under brave
semantics outlier detection requires the efforts of determining both the witness and the outliers that, in fact,
both contribute to the task of guessing the satisfying assignment - see proof of Theorem 3. Intuitively, the
reason for this behavior under cautious semantics lies in the fact that the condition (2) of Definition 1, i.e.,
P (P(Φ))W ,O 6|=c W , just amounts at identifying a model of P (P(Φ))W ,O that does not entail an element
of W . Hence, outliers act just as “switches” under cautious semantics, for they solely prevent the entailment
of any element of W .
The consequences of this difference will become more evident in the next section, while discussing the
complexity of other outlier detection problems. Intuitively, expect that each time the witness set is given or
has its size fixed, then the outlier detection problem will have the same complexity as the general case under
brave semantics, but will become easier under cautious semantics.
3.3 Computational Complexity of Outlier Checking Problems
In this section the complexity of some further problems related to outlier identification is studied. Specifi-
cally, given a rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, the following problems will be considered:
• OUTLIER−CHECKING: given O ⊆ P obs, is O an outlier for some witness set W?
• WITNESS−CHECKING problem: given W ⊆ P obs, is W a witness for some outlier O in P?
• OW−CHECKING: given O,W ⊆ P obs, is O an outlier in P with witness W?
The following theorem states the complexity of the first of the problems listed above.
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Theorem 5. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair. Then, OUTLIER−CHECKING is
1. NP-complete, for stratified LPs, and
2. ΣP2 -complete (under both brave and cautious semantics) for general LPs.
Proof.
1. As for the membership, given O ⊆ P obs, let us guess a setW and verify that it is an outlier witness in P
for O. To this aim it must be verified that conditions P (P)W |= ¬W and P (P)W ,O 6|= ¬W hold. These
tasks are feasible in polynomial time since P (P) is stratified and hence it has a unique stable model that
can be computed in polynomial time. As for the hardness, the same line of reasoning as the proof of
Theorem 2 is exploited, in which given a formula Φ rule-observation pair P(Φ) = 〈P rls(Φ), P obs(Φ)〉
has been built. It follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 2 (by letting X ′ = X ) that O =
{disabled} is an outlier ⇔ the formula Φ is satisfiable.
2. As for the membership, given O ⊆ P obs, let us guess a set W and verify that it is an outlier witness in
P for O. These latter tasks amount to solving an NP and a co-NP problem, as seen in Theorems 3 and 4.
As for the hardness, the same reduction as Theorems 3 and 4 is exploited, in which given a formula Φ a
rule-observation pair P(Φ) = 〈P rls(Φ), P obs(Φ)〉 has been built. It follows immediately from the proofs
of Theorems 3 and 4 that O = {disabled} is an outlier ⇔ the formula Φ is satisfiable. Specifically, to
see why this is the case for the proof of Theorem 3, it is sufficient to let X ′ = X in the ‘⇒’-part. ✷
Next the complexity of the WITNESS−CHECKING problem is studied. Interestingly, since
WITNESS−CHECKING assumes the witness to be provided in the input, its complexity is affected by the
chosen semantics, as briefly outlined in the previous section.
Theorem 6. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair. Then, WITNESS−CHECKING is
1. NP-complete, for stratified P rls,
2. ΣP2 -complete under brave semantics for general P rls, and
3. DP -complete under cautious semantics for general P rls.
Proof.
1. As for the membership, given W ⊆ P obs, let us guess a set O and check that it is an outlier in P with
witness W . To this aim it must be verified that conditions P (P)W |= ¬W and P (P)W ,O 6|= ¬W hold.
Since P (P) is stratified this check is feasible in polynomial time. The same reduction as Theorem 2 can
be exploited, in which given a formula Φ a rule-observation pair P(Φ) = 〈P rls(Φ), P obs(Φ)〉 has been
built. It follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 2 (by letting X ′ = ∅) that W = {sat} is a
witness for an outlier in P(Φ) if and only if the formula Φ is satisfiable.
2. As for the membership, given W ⊆ P obs, let us guess a set O and verify that it is an outlier in P with
witness W . These latter tasks amount to solving an NP and a co-NP problem, as seen in Theorem 3.
As for the hardness,the same reduction of Theorem 3 can be exploited, in which given a formula Φ a
rule-observation pair P(Φ) = 〈P rls(Φ), P obs(Φ)〉 has been built. It follows immediately from the proof
of Theorem 3 (by letting X ′ = ∅) that W = {sat} a witness for an outlier in P(Φ)⇔ the formula Φ is
satisfiable.
3. Both conditions P (P)W |=c ¬W and P (P)W ,O 6|=c ¬W have to hold for a setO. The former condition
can be checked in co-NP, whereas the latter amounts to guessing both an outlier O and a model for
P (P)W ,O , which is feasible in NP.
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As for the hardness, let φ′ = c′1 ∧ . . . ∧ c′r be a boolean formula on the set of variables x1, . . . , xn,
c′k = t
′
k,1 ∨ t
′
k,2 ∨ t
′
k,3 (1 ≤ k ≤ r), and let φ′′ = c′′1 ∧ . . . ∧ c′′s be a boolean formula on the set
of variables y1, . . . , ym, c′′h = t′′h,1 ∨ t′′h,2 ∨ t′′h,3 (1 ≤ h ≤ s). Without loss of generality, assume that
the sets x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , ym have no variables in common. A rule-observation pair P(φ′, φ′′) =
〈P rls(φ′, φ′′), P obs(φ′, φ′′)〉 is defined such that (i) P (φ′, φ′′)obs is the set {sat, o}, and (ii) P (φ′, φ′′)rls
is
xi ← not ai, o. 1 ≤ i ≤ n
ai ← not xi, o. 1 ≤ i ≤ n
c′k ← ρ(t
′
k,1), o. 1 ≤ k ≤ r
c′k ← ρ(t
′
k,2), o. 1 ≤ k ≤ r
c′k ← ρ(t
′
k,3), o. 1 ≤ k ≤ r
yj ← not bj, not o. 1 ≤ j ≤ m
bj ← not yj, not o. 1 ≤ j ≤ m
c′′h ← ρ(t
′′
h,1), not o. 1 ≤ h ≤ s
c′′h ← ρ(t
′′
h,2), not o. 1 ≤ h ≤ s
c′′h ← ρ(t
′′
h,3), not o. 1 ≤ h ≤ s
sat← c′1, . . . , c
′
r.
sat← c′′1 , . . . , c
′′
s .
Now it is shown that φ′ is unsatisfiable and φ′′ is satisfiable ⇔ there exists an outlier in P (φ′, φ′′) with
witness W = {sat}.
(⇒) Assume that φ′ is unsatisfiable and φ′′ is satisfiable. It is shown that {o} is an outlier with witness
{sat}. Indeed, given that o is true in P(φ′, φ′′){sat} and given the encoding of this program, there
is no model M ′ ∈ SM(P(φ′, φ′′){sat}) such that sat ∈ M ′, because φ′ is not satisfiable. Thus,
P(φ′, φ′′){sat} |=c ¬ sat holds and condition (1) in Definition 1 is satisfied. Similarly, given that
o is false in P(φ′, φ′′){sat},{o} and given the encoding of the program, there is a model M ′′ ∈
SM(P(φ′, φ′′){sat},{o}) such that sat ∈M ′′, because φ′′ is satisfiable. Thus, P(φ′, φ′′){sat},{o} 6|=c
¬ sat holds, and condition (2) in Definition 1 is satisfied as well.
(⇒) Assume that there is an outlier O in P (φ′, φ′′) with witness W = {sat}. It is shown that φ′ is
unsatisfiable and φ′′ is satisfiable. Indeed, notice beforehand that the only set candidate to be an
outlier is {o}, because sat and o are the only observations at hand. Then, because of Definition 1:
(1) there is no model M ′ ∈ SM(P(φ′, φ′′){sat}) such that sat ∈ M ′, and (2) there is a model
M ′′ ∈ SM(P(φ′, φ′′){sat},{o}) such that sat ∈M ′′. Given the encoding of the programs above and
the fact that o is true in P(φ′, φ′′){sat} while it is false in P(φ′, φ′′){sat},{o}, we conclude from (1)
that φ′ is not satisfiable, and from (2) that φ′′ is satisfiable. ✷
Finally, the next theorem provides the complexity for the OW−CHECKING problem, in which it is simply
checked whether two given setsO andW are an outlier and a witness for it, respectively. Notice that problem
OW−CHECKING is relevant as it may constitute the basic operator to be implemented in a system of outlier
detection. Interestingly, in this case, the complexity does not depend on the semantics.
Theorem 7. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair. Then, OW−CHECKING is
1. P-complete, for stratified P rls, and
2. DP -complete (under both brave and cautious semantics) for general P rls.
Proof.
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1. As for the membership, given W,O ⊆ P obs, let us check in polynomial time that P (P)W |= ¬W
and that P (P)W ,O 6|= ¬W . As for the hardness, given a stratified logic program P and an atom a, the
P-complete problem of deciding whether P |= ¬ a is reduced to OW−CHECKING. Consider the rule-
observation pair P with P rls = P ∪ {a ← not b} and P obs = {a, b}, where b is a new propositional
letter not occurring in P . It is shown that P |= ¬a⇔ {a} is an outlier witness for {b} in P.
(⇒) Assume that P |= ¬a. Then, {a} is an outlier witness for {b} in P. Indeed, consider the program
P (P){a}, and notice that a cannot be entailed because of the assumption and of the fact that the
body of the rule a← not b is false because b is true in P (P){a}. Thus, condition (1) in Definition 1
holds. As for condition (2), consider the program P (P){a},{b} and notice that it entails a, precisely
because of the rule a← not b.
(⇐) Assume that {a} is an outlier witness for {b} in P. To conclude that P |= ¬a, it is sufficient to
consider condition (1) in Definition 1. Indeed, it must be the case that P (P){a} does not entail a.
Given that the rule a ← not b cannot be used for entailing a (because b is true in P (P){a}), it can
be concluded that a cannot be entailed by P .
2. As for the membership, given W,O ⊆ P obs, conditions P (P)W |= ¬W and P (P)W ,O 6|= ¬W can
be checked respectively in co-NP and NP under cautious semantics, and respectively in NP and co-NP
under brave semantics, hence in both cases the conjunction of a NP and a co-NP problem has to be
answered, that is a DP problem. As for the hardness the proof is analogous to Point 3 of Theorem 6, by
letting W = {sat} and O = {o}. ✷
Up to this point, attention has been focused on outlier decision problems. Turning to outlier computation
problems, the following result can be established by noticing that in the proofs of the EXISTENCE problem
(Theorems 2, 3 and 4), solving a satisfiability problem is reduced to computing an outlier.
Corollary 1. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair. Then, the COMPUTATION problem, i.e., com-
puting an arbitrary outlier in P, is (i) FNP-complete, for stratified rule components, and (ii) FΣP2 -complete,
for general rule components.
3.4 Data Complexity of Outlier Problems
In all the complexity results derived so far, a setting has been considered in which both the rule component
and the observation component are part of the outlier detection problem input. In order to have a more
complete picture, in this section the data complexity of these problems is investigated. That is, a fixed rule
component is considered and a set of observations are, instead, provided as the input. Such a kind of analysis
may be useful in the context of database applications, where one is usually interested in understanding how
the complexity of a problem varies as a function of the database size (cf. [84]). In this respect, the analysis
becomes more interesting if also non-ground programs are considered. Therefore, in the following, both the
ground and non-ground settings are considered.
Ground programs. Some further computational complexity notions are now recalled. Let C be a boolean
circuit. The size of C is the total number of its gates. The depth of C is the number of gates in the longest
path from any input to any output in C . A family {Ci} of boolean circuits, where Ci accepts strings of size
i, is uniform if there exists a Turing machine T that, on input i, produces the circuit Ci. {Ci} is logspace
uniform if T carries out its task using O(log i) space. Then, AC0 is the class of decision problems solved
by logspace uniform families of circuits of polynomial size and constant depth, with AND, OR, and NOT
gates of unbounded fan-in.
23
It is not difficult to see that, handling ground programs, all the basic outlier detection problems have
their data complexity lying in AC0. Indeed, let A denote the set of propositional letters occurring in the rule
component. Under the data complexity measure, the rule component is fixed, while the input of the problem
consists of the observation component. Nonetheless, it can be shown that the complexity of outlier detection
problems on ground programs is independent of the observation component out of letters in A. Indeed, being
the rule component fixed, if O is an outlier with associated witness W , then O∩A is an outlier as well with
associated witness W∩A. Thus, given a pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, it holds that there is an outlier in P iff there
is an outlier in Pe = 〈P rls, P obs ∩A〉. Once the pair Pe is available, conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 1 can
be tested using a constant amount of time as the number of outlier/witness pairs in Pe is upper bounded by
22n and the number of models of Pe is upper bounded by 2n, where n denotes the number of letters in the
set A, which is a constant. Both the latter and the former tasks can be solved in AC0. Thus, the following
theorem holds.
Theorem 8. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair such that P rls is a fixed propositional logic
theory. Then, EXISTENCE, OUTLIER−CHECKING, WITNESS−CHECKING, and OW−CHECKING are in AC0.
As a consequence, outlier detection problems under the data complexity measure can be solved in poly-
nomial time and are highly-parallelizable.
Non-ground programs. The investigation of the data complexity for this setting can be carried out, by
preliminary putting into evidence the features it shares with the ground case when both rule and observation
components are part of the input. The basic idea is that the reductions used in proving complexity results for
outlier detection problems (carried out via encodings into the rule component which is, therefore, required to
be part of the input) can be “simulated” by some fixed non-ground encoding. In particular, the instantiation
of such non-ground encodings can be made in such a way to simulate the encodings exploited in the case
of ground programs. Let us consider, for instance, the data complexity for problem EXISTENCE under the
cautious semantics.
Theorem 9. LetP = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair such that P rls is a fixed general logic program.
Then EXISTENCE under the cautious semantics is ΣP2 -complete.
Proof. (Membership) Given a fixed general logic program P rls and a set of ground facts P obs, it must
be shown that there are two disjoint sets W,O ⊆ P obs such that P (P)W |= ¬W (query q′) and
P (P)W ,O 6|= ¬W (query q′′). Recall that the complexity of the entailment problem for general proposi-
tional logic programs is co-NP-complete. Thus, a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine with
an NP oracle can be built solving EXISTENCE as follows: the machine guesses both the sets W and O, com-
putes the propositional logic programs ground(P (P)W ) and ground(P (P)W ,O) – this task can be done in
polynomial time since the size of these programs is polynomially related to the size of P obs, and then solves
queries q′ and q′′ by two calls to the oracle.
(Hardness) Let Φ = ∃X∀Yf be a quantified Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form, i.e., f is a
Boolean formula of the form d1 ∨ . . . ∨ dm, over the variables X = x1, . . . xn, and Y = y1, . . . yq. With Φ
the following set of facts P obs(Φ) is associated:
o1 : unsat.
o2 : disabled.
o3,k : variable∃(xk). 1 ≤ k ≤ n
o4,i : variable∀(yi, y(i+1) mod (q+1)). 1 ≤ i ≤ q
o5,j : disjunct(dj , d(j+1) mod (m+1), ℘(tj,1), ℓ(tj,1), ℘(tj,2), ℓ(tj,2), ℘(tj,3), ℓ(tj,3)). 1 ≤ j ≤ m
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where dj = tj,1 ∧ tj,2 ∧ tj,3, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, ℓ(t) denotes the atom occurring in the literal t, and ℘(t) is the
constant pos, if t is a positive literal, and the constant neg, if t is a negative literal. Intuitively, the atoms
o3,k, o4,i, and o5,j together provide an encoding of the formula Φ. Such an encoding will be exploited by
the subsequent rule part (see below) in order to evaluate the truth value of the formula Φ. In particular, each
atom o3,k is associated to a distinct existentially quantified variables, each atom o4,i is associated to a distinct
universally quantified variable, while each atom o5,j is associated to a distinct disjunct dj occurring in to the
formula Φ. As for the atoms unsat and disabled, they have the same role played in Theorem 4.
The rule part of the pair is composed by the following fixed general logic program P rls:


r0 : disjunctT rue← disjunct( , , pos,X1, pos,X2, pos,X3),
variable∃(X1), variable∃(X2), variable∃(X3).
r1 : disjunctT rue← disjunct( , , neg,X1, pos,X2, pos,X3),
not variable∃(X1), variable∃(X2), variable∃(X3).
.
.
.
r7 : disjunctT rue← disjunct( , , neg,X1, neg,X2, neg,X3),
not variable∃(X1), not variable∃(X2), not variable∃(X3).
r8 : disjunctT rue← disjunct( , , pos, Y1, pos,X2, pos,X3),
variable∀True(Y1), variable∃(X2), variable∃(X3).
.
.
.
r63 : disjunctT rue← disjunct( , , neg, Y1, neg, Y2, neg, Y3),
not variable∀True(Y1), not variable∀True(Y2), not variable∀True(Y3).
{
r64 : variable∀True(Y )← variable∀(Y, ), not variable∀False(Y ).
r65 : variable∀False(Y )← variable∀(Y, ), not variable∀True(Y ).


r66 : disjunct(d0, d1, pos, x0, pos, x0, pos, x0).
r67 : variable∃(x0).
r68 : variable∀(y0, y1).
r69 : unsound← disjunct(C1, C2, , , , , , ), not disjunctIN(C2).
r70 : disjunctIN(C2)← disjunct(C2, , , , , , , ).
r71 : unsound← variable∀(Y 1, Y 2), not variable∀IN(Y 2).
r72 : variable∀IN(Y 2)← variable∀IN(Y 2, ).
r73 : sound← not unsound.


r74 : sat← sound, disjunctT rue.
r75 : unsat← not sat.
r76 : unsat← not disabled.
Next, some comments on the rules composing the program P rls are provided.
Rules r0 . . . r63 are introduced in order to compute the truth value of the disjuncts composing the formula
Φ. Indeed, in the body of each of these rules, there is exactly one atom o5,j , encoding a generic disjunct dj in
Φ, and three atoms evaluating the truth value of the three literals occurring in to the disjunct. Notice that, 64
rules are needed in order to represent all the possible schemes of disjuncts occurring into a Φ formula, that
is, all the possible conjunctions of three boolean variables, either negated or positive, of two distinct types,
i.e., either existentially or universally quantified.
Rules r64 and r65 serve the purpose to guess a possible truth value assignment to the universally quanti-
fied variables in Φ. Intuitively, being the ground atom variable∀True(yi) (variable∀False(yi) resp.) true
in a model of the overall program, means the corresponding universally quantified variable yi is intended to
be true (false resp.) in a suitable truth value assignment to the variables of Φ which is encoded by the model.
25
Rules r69 . . . r73 prevent that the atoms o4,i and o5,j of the observation part, associated respectively to the
universally quantified variables yi and to the disjuncts dj of Φ, belong to some outlier or witness of the over-
all pair. Indeed, if some of these atoms is removed from the observation component, then the rule component
will not evaluate Φ correctly. To this aim, the rule r71 (r69 resp.) will imply the atom unsound whenever
an atom o4,i (o5,j resp.) is present in the model while the subsequent atom o4,i+1 (o5,j+1 resp.) is not. This
check can be accomplished since each atom o4,i (o5,j resp.) carry both the constant yi (dj resp.) associated
to the variable yi (the disjunct dj resp.) and the constant yi+1 (dj+1 resp.) associated to the subsequent vari-
able yi+1 (disjunct dj+1 resp.). Thus, loosely speaking, universally quantified variables and disjuncts of the
formula are chained together so that either none of them or all together can be removed without entailing
unsound. In order to prevent the latter possibility, a dummy disjunct (see rule r66), which evaluates always
true since it contains the dummy existentially quantified variable x0 which is always assumed to be true in
its turn (see rule r67), and a dummy universally quantified variable y0 (see rule r68) are introduced in the
rule part, referring respectively to the first disjunct d1 and to the first universally quantified variable y1 of Φ.
Since both r66 and r68 cannot be removed for sure from the overall pair, then they guarantee that unsound
is true in a model of the overall program if and only if at least an observation o4,i or o5,j is removed from
the observations.
Finally, rules r74 . . . r76 have the same purpose of the corresponding rules in the reduction described
in Theorem 4, the only difference being now that in order to entail sat the rule r74 requires the formula is
syntactically sound other than evaluating true.
It is now clear that the rest of the theorem will follow a line of reasoning analogous to that of Theorem 4.
For completeness, we continue completing the formal proof.
Now it is shown that Φ is valid ⇔ there is an outlier in P(Φ) = 〈P rls, P obs〉.
(⇒) Suppose that Φ is valid, and let σX be a truth value assignment for the existentially quantified variables
X that satisfies f . Consider the set W composed by the fact unsat plus all the facts variable∃(xi)
associated to the variables that are false in σX , that is the set {unsat}∪{variable∃(x) | x ∈ Lit(σX)−},
and consider the set O composed only by the fact disabled. Note that the stable models MY of the
program P (P(Φ))W are in one-to-one correspondence with the truth assignments σY of the universally
quantified variables (consider rules r64 and r65). Now, since the formula is satisfied by σX , for eachMY ,
sat ∈ MY and unsat 6∈ MY . Hence, P (P(Φ))W |=c ¬W . Conversely, the program P (P(Φ))W ,O in
which disabled is false, trivially derives unsat. It can be concluded that O is an outlier in P(Φ), and W
is a witness for it.
(⇐) Suppose that there is an outlier O with witness W in P(Φ). As unsat is the unique fact in P obs(Φ)
that can be derived by P (P(Φ))W ,O , then in order to satisfy condition (2) of Definition 1, it is the case
that W contains unsat. Furthermore, in order to satisfy condition (1) of Definition 1, disabled does not
belong to W . Now, it is shown that {unsat} ⊆ W ⊆ {unsat, variable∃(x1), . . . , variable∃(xn)}.
Since unsat must be false in P (Φ)W , because of condition (1) in Definition 1, it can be observed that
P (Φ)W entails sat and, thus, by rules r73 and r74, it does not entail unsound. Assume now, for the
sake of contradiction, that a fact o4,i (o5,j resp.) belongs toW . Then, program P (Φ)W entails unsound,
which is impossible — see the general comments about the reduction reported above.
Let X be the subset {variable∃(x) | x ∈ (W \ {unsat})} and let σX be the
truth value assignment σ({x1,...,xn}\X )∪¬X to the set of variables X. Clearly, P (P(Φ))W |=c
({variable∃(x1), . . . , variable∃(xn)} \ X ) ∪ ¬X . Furthermore, as P (P(Φ))W |=c ¬unsat, then it
is the case that for each subset Y of Y, the stable model MY of P (P(Φ))W associated with Y , that
is the model MY containing {variable∀True(y) | y ∈ Y } and no other fact of the same predicate, is
such that sat ∈ MY . That is, for each truth value assignment σY to the variables in the set Y , there is at
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least a disjunct such that σX ◦ σY makes the formula f true. As a consequence, Φ is valid. To conclude
the proof, note that O = {disabled} is always an outlier having such a witness. ✷
Theorem 9 depicts a strategy to reformulate the reduction illustrated in previous Theorem 4 in terms of
a reduction exploiting a non-ground rule-observation pair whose rule component is kept fixed. Notably,
this strategy can be also adopted for all the other reductions exploited in the proofs presented so far. For
instance, we leave to the careful reader to check that, by adapting the same line of reasoning to Theorems
2 and 3, the following results concerning outlier detection problems under the data complexity measure can
be eventually obtained.
Theorem 10. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair such that P rls is a fixed stratified logic
program. Then EXISTENCE is NP-complete.
Theorem 11. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair such that P rls is a fixed general logic pro-
gram. Then EXISTENCE under the brave semantics is ΣP2 -complete.
4 Minimum-size Outlier Detection
4.1 Extending the Framework
There are several practical situations in which the computation of just any outlier is not what is really sought.
Consider, for instance, the short story in the Introduction, and recall that Nino is considered to be an outlier
by his Finnish colleagues because he is the only person with black hair and brown eyes among the other
people working for the team. This assumption appears quite reasonable, given our intuition of outliers being
individuals whose behavior is deviant w.r.t. the “normal” one. However, it is not the only possible one;
indeed, by changing the roles played by Nino and the other team members, it might be concluded that all the
team members but Nino are in fact outliers and that Nino having black hair and brown eyes is the associated
witness. If asked to assess the correctness of the latter conclusion, most of us would certain disagree with it,
because we implicitly associate the notion of normality with the characteristics embodied by the majority of
the observations at hand, and for we are inclined to label an individual as anomalous precisely because it is
rare in the observations.
Therefore, it is sometimes natural to constrain the basic notion of outliers, formally defined in Def-
inition 1, in order to account for some criteria aiming at singling out outliers of minimum size. In this
section, the outlier detection problem will be studied with the additional constraint of minimizing the out-
lier size. It is worthwhile noting that this setting differs with what is generally required by the principle
of minimal diagnosis [76], where minimality according to set inclusion rather that to cardinality is of-
ten considered. In fact, the inclusion based minimality criterion does not generally prevent the possibil-
ity of having outliers involving the majority of the observations at hand as, e.g., in the above reported
example. As a further (extreme) example, consider the rule-observation pair P1 = 〈P rls1 , P obs1 〉, where
P rls1 = {a← not o1, ..., not on. b← not o.} and P obs1 = {o1, ..., on, o}. Then, there are two minimal
outliers in P1: {o1, ..., on} whose associated witness is {a}, and {o} whose associated witness is {b}.
Clearly, singling out the former outlier may be undesirable in several situations, since it includes all but
one observation and therefore fails in conveying information about abnormality with respect to the observed
population; the latter outlier, instead, seems to better reflect the intuition beyond outlier detection problems.
A first natural problem that arises in this setting is to decide about the existence of outliers of bounded
size. For instance, it may be interesting to decide whether there are outliers consisting at most the 5% of
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the observations or whether there are outliers consisting of one individual only. Actually, it is next shown
that bounding the size of the outliers we are looking for does not affect the complexity of the EXISTENCE
problem.
Theorem 12. Given in input a rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, and a natural number k, the
EXISTENCE[k] problem of deciding the existence of outlier O of size at most k (|O| ≤ k) in P is
1. NP-complete, for stratified P rls, and
2. ΣP2 , for general P rls.
Proof. For the membership it is sufficient to observe that the membership parts in Theorems 2, 3 and 4 can
be modified by verifying that the guessed outlier O has size at most k. Such a test is feasible in polynomial
time, and hence does not affect the complexity of the algorithms. As for the hardness it is sufficient to
observe that in the proof of the theorems above, if {disabled} is an outlier, then the formula is satisfied. ✷
Similarly, an analogous version of the problem WITNESS−CHECKING can be formalized: given W ⊆
P obs and a fixed natural number k, is W a witness for any outlier O in P, such that |O| ≤ k? This problem
will be called WITNESS−CHECKING[k].
Interestingly, this time bounding the size of outlier indeed influences the complexity associated with
the problem. In fact, for general LPs it becomes DP -complete even under brave semantics (rather than ΣP2 -
complete), and for stratified LPs it becomes even feasible in polynomial time. This is shown in the following
theorem.
Theorem 13. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair. Then, WITNESS−CHECKING[k] is
1. P-complete, for stratified P rls, and
2. DP -complete (under both brave and cautious semantics) for general P rls.
Proof. 1. As for the membership, given W ⊆ P obs, it has to be verified that, there is O ⊆ (P obs \ W)
such that |O| ≤ k, both P (P)W |= ¬W and P (P)W ,O hold. Since the number of such outliers is upper
bounded by |P obs|k, hence polynomially time bounded, and since P (P) is stratified, the overall check
is feasible in polynomial time. As for the hardness, a reduction is exploited to the P-complete problem
PROPOSITIONAL STRATIFIED LOGIC PROGRAMMING, i.e. the problem: given a propositional
stratified logic program P and an atom a, decide whether P |= ¬a. Consider the rule-observation pair
P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, with P rls = P ∪ {a ← ¬b} and P obs = {a, b}, where b is a propositional letter not
occurring in P . Clearly, P rls is stratified and there is an outlier O of size |O| ≤ 1 in P having witness
W = {a} iff P |= ¬a.
2. Firstly, let us consider brave semantics. Let W be a subset of P obs, and let O1, . . . ,Om, m =(|P obs\W|
1
)
+
(|P obs\W|
2
)
+ . . .+
(|P obs\W|
k
)
, be all the subsets of P obs \W having size equal or less than
k. Notice that deciding checking whether P (P)W |=b ¬W , i.e., whether condition (1) in Definition1
is satisfied, is feasible in NP since it amounts to guessing a model for P (P)W and at verifying that it
entails ¬W .
Let us consider, instead, condition (2) subject to the size constraint, i.e., it must be decided the existence
of a set O, with |O| ≤ k, such that P (P)W ,O 6|=b ¬W . Actually, the complementary condition can
be faced, denoted by C2, of deciding whether for each set O ∈ {O1, . . . ,Om}, there is a model M of
P (P)W ,O such that M entails ¬W .
To this aim, let Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, denote the new logic program obtained from P (P)W ,Oi by replacing
each propositional letter p occurring there with a local copy of p, say pi, and let Wi denote the new
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set obtained from W by substituting to each propositional letter w there occurring, the local copy wi
of w in Pi. Consider the logic program P ′ = P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm and the set W ′ = W1 ∪ . . . ∪ Wm. We
note that both P ′ and W ′ can be built in polynomial time. Now, it is easy to see that, by construction,
P ′ |=b ¬W
′ if and only if C2 is satisfied. Thus, given W ⊆ P obs, checking that P (P)W |=b ¬W and
that P (P)W ,O 6|=b ¬W amounts to solving an NP and a co-NP problem. As for the hardness, given two
boolean formulas φ and φ′, the problem of deciding whether φ is satisfiable and φ′ is unsatisfiable can
be reduced to WITNESS−CHECKING[k] under brave semantics using a reduction similar to that shown in
Point 3 of the proof of Theorem 6.
Finally, the proof for cautious semantics follows the one of Point 3 of Theorem 6. ✷
4.2 Complexity of Computation Problems
As already done in the context of Section 3.2, next let us concentrate on computation problems. Specifically,
interest is in the COMPUTATION[min] problem: computing an outlier whose size is the minimum over the
sizes of all the outliers – by min(P) the minimum size value is denoted. Notice that in the case of no
outlier, min(P) is undefined. To this aim, the computational complexity of a (still, decision) variant of the
OW−CHECKING problem is studied, denoted by OW−CHECKING[min], in which the attention is focused on
checking minimum-size outliers only: given O,W ⊆ P obs, is O an outlier in P, with witness W , such that
|O| = min(P)?
Theorem 14. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair. Then, the problem OW−CHECKING[min] is
1. co-NP-complete, for stratified P rls, and
2. ΠP2 -complete (under both brave and cautious semantics), for general P rls.
Proof.
1. (Membership) GivenO,W ⊆ P obs, let us consider the complementary problem OW−CHECKING[min] of
deciding whether it is not true that O is an outlier in P, with witness W , such that |O| = min(P). This
problem can be solved by building a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine that (i) verifies
in polynomial time that O is an outlier with witness W in P (if it is not the case then the machines stops
replying “yes”), (ii) guesses the sets set O′ and W ′, and verifies in polynomial time that (iii) O′ is an
outlier with witness W ′ in P, and (iv) |O′| < |O| – notice that both (i) and (iv) have been observed
to be feasible in polynomial time in the membership part of Theorem 2. Then, OW−CHECKING[min] is
feasible in NP and, hence, OW−CHECKING[min] is in co-NP.
(Hardness) Recall that deciding whether a Boolean formula Φ in conjunctive normal form is
not satisfiable, is an co-NP-complete problem. Consider again the rule-observation pair P(Φ) =
〈P rls(Φ), P obs(Φ)〉 built in the proof of Theorem 2. Then, we build in polynomial time the rule-
observation pair P∗(Φ) = 〈P ∗rls(Φ), P ∗obs(Φ)〉 such that: (i) P ∗obs(Φ) = P obs(Φ) ∪ P ′obs, where
P ′
obs = {w, o1, o2}, and (ii) P ∗rls(Φ) = P rls(Φ) ∪ P ′rls where P ′rls is:
w ← not o1, not o2.
o1 ← o2.
o2 ← o1.
It is easy to see that the set O = {o1, o2} is an outlier in P∗(Φ) with witness W = {w}. Moreover,
min(P∗(Φ)) = |O| ⇔ Φ is not satisfiable. Indeed, in Theorem 2 it was shown that Φ is satisfiable ⇔
O′ = {disabled} is an outlier in P(Φ). Hence, the result follows by observing that O′ is such that
|O′| < |O|.
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2. (Membership) The membership in ΠP2 derives from the fact that the complementary problem
OW−CHECKING[min] can be solved in ΣP2 under both brave and cautious semantics. Indeed, a
polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine with an NP oracle can be built that (i) verifies that O
is an outlier with witness W in P making two calls to the oracle (if it is not the case then the machines
stops replying “yes”), (ii) guesses the sets set O′ and W ′, and verifies (iii) that O′ is an outlier with
witness W ′ in P making two other calls to the oracle, and (iv) that |O′| < |O| – notice that both (i) and
(iv) have been observed to be DP -complete in Theorem 7. Then, OW−CHECKING[min] is feasible in ΣP2
and, hence, OW−CHECKING[min] is in ΠP2 .
(Hardness) Let Φ be a quantified Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form. Recall that deciding
whether Φ is not valid is a ΠP2 -complete problem. The result follows immediately by exploiting the
reduction described in the Hardness part in the Point 1 above, the only difference being that the rule-
observation pairs P(Φ) to be considered are respectively those described in Theorems 3 and 4. To this
aim it is sufficient to observe that in the proofs for the two theorems above, it was shown that the formula
Φ is satisfiable if and only if there is an outlier of the form {disabled}. ✷
By exploiting Theorem 14, it can be shown an FΣP2 (FΣP3 resp.) upper bound to the complexity of
the problem of computing an outlier having minimum size in stratified (resp., general) pairs. This can be
done by first guessing any outlier with an associated witness and then verifying that it is indeed minimal.
But, actually better than this can be achieved by defining a more efficient computation method based on
identifying the actual value of min(P) and, then, guessing an outlier whose size equals min(P).
The case of stratified rule observation pairs is firstly considered, for which the problem turns out to be
F∆P2 [O(log n)]-complete, where n denotes the size of the rule-observation pair. The result can be derived
by establishing a one-to-one correspondence between outliers and cliques in a graph – computing the size
of the maximum clique was, in fact, shown to be F∆P2 [O(log n)]-complete in [57]. Notice that, to this end,
the proof of Theorem 2 does not help because it exploits a construction from the satisfiability problem
and, more importantly, because the guess of the true variables in the assignment is shared by the outlier
and its associated witness, so that for any satisfying assignment there is an exponential number of associated
outliers. Therefore, the most relevant technical problem to be solved in order to prove the result is to establish
the cited one-to-one correspondence between outliers and graph cliques, by exploiting a more intricate
reduction5 than the one used in Theorem 2.
Theorem 15. Given a rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, computing the value min(P) (if defined) is
F∆P2 [O(log n)]-complete, for stratified P rls.
Proof. (Membership) Given the pair P, it is preliminary observed that the maximum value of min(P)
is max = |P obs| = O(|P|). Then, by a binary search on the range [0,max], the value min(P) can be
computed: at each step of the search, a threshold is given in the range [0,max], say k, and it has to be
decided whether the problem EXISTENCE[k] has some solution. After logmax steps at most the procedure
ends, and the value of min(P) can be returned, if this value is not zero. Since EXISTENCE[k] is feasible in
NP, it follows that the procedure is feasible in FPNP[O(logn)] = F∆P2 [O(log n)], where n is |P|.
(Hardness) Given a graph G = 〈A,E〉, with A = {1, . . . , n} being a set of nodes and E ⊆ A × A
a set of edges, a clique C for G is a set of nodes such that ∀i, j ∈ C , there is an edge (i, j) ∈ E. Recall
that computing the size of the maximum clique in a graph is F∆P2 [O(log n)] [19]. A rule-observation pair
5 This reduction might indeed also be used to prove Theorem 2. However, its intricacies would have made understanding the
intrinsic complexity of the basic outlier detection problem much more difficult to grasp.
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P(G) = 〈P rls(G), P obs(G)〉 is built such that: (i) P obs(G) contains the facts xini , xouti , and yi, for each
node i in A, and the fact yes; (ii) P rls(G) is
r1 : unsat← x
in
i , x
in
j . 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n s.t. (i, j) 6∈ E
r2 : unsat← x
in
i , x
out
i . 1 ≤ i ≤ n
r3 : oki ← x
in
i . 1 ≤ i ≤ n
r4 : oki ← x
out
i . 1 ≤ i ≤ n
r5 : ok ← ok1, . . . , okn.
r6 : yes← not unsat, ok.
r7 : x
in
i ← x
in
j , unsat, ok. 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
r8 : x
in
i ← x
out
j , unsat, ok. 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
r9 : x
out
i ← x
in
j , unsat, ok. 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
r10 : x
out
i ← x
out
j , unsat, ok. 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
r11 : yi ← x
in
i , ok. 1 ≤ i ≤ n
r12 : x
in
i ← yi, ok. 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Let C be a clique in G. Let us denote by OC the set {xℓ11 , . . . , xℓnn } ∪ {yi | ℓi = in}, where each ℓi is in
(resp. out) if and only if the node i is not (resp. is) in C . Next it is shown that the above construction is such
that (i) for each clique C , the set OC is an outlier with witness W = {yes} in P(G); and (ii) each outlier
O in P(G) is of the form O = OC , for some clique C .
(i) Let C be a clique in G. Consider the set W = {yes}. Then, each fact of the form xini , xouti , and yi is
true in the program P (P(G))W . Hence, due to the rules unsat ← xini , xouti , unsat is true in turn, and
P (P(G))W |= ¬yes, i.e., condition (1) in Definition 1 is satisfied. Let us now consider the program
P (P(G))W ,O , for O = OC . It must be shown that P (P(G))W ,O |= yes. To this aim, the unique
stable model of P (P(G))W ,O is proven to be M = {yes} ∪ {ok, ok1, . . . , okn} ∪ {xin1 , . . . , xinn } ∪
{xout1 , . . . , x
out
n } ∪ {y1, . . . , yn} \ O
C
, i.e., M is the unique minimal model of P (P(G))MW ,O . Actually,
the structure of P (P(G))MW ,O is the same as the one of P (P(G))W ,O but for the rule r6 : yes ←
not unsat, ok replaced by the rule r′6 : yes ← ok., because of the fact that unsat is false in M . Let us
first note that M is in fact a model of P (P(G))MW ,O , by exploiting the following arguments:
– Rules r3, r4 and r5 are satisfied by M , as ok and all the facts of the form oki are true in M .
– Rule r′6 is satisfied by M , because yes belongs to M .
– Rules r7, r8, r9, and r10 are satisfied by M , because unsat does not belong to M .
– Rules r11 and r12 are satisfied by M . Indeed, by construction of the set OC , yi 6∈ OC iff xouti ∈ OC
and, therefore, yi ∈M iff xini ∈M holds as well.
– Rule r2 is satisfied by M , because of the construction of M and OC which prevents from xini and
xouti being both true at the same time (a node is either in the clique or it is not).
– Rule r1 is satisfied by M . Indeed, it is preliminary noticed that the body of the rule accounts for
pairs of nodes that are not connected by means of an edge in E. Then, for each pair of predicates
xini and xinj being true in M , it is the case that they are connected by means of an edge in E; this
is because xouti and xoutj are in fact in OC and, therefore, are nodes of the clique C . Thus, unsat
cannot be entailed by this rule.
To conclude the proof of (i), it is necessary now to show that M is in fact the minimal
model of the program P (P(G))MW ,O . Let us preliminary notice that the atoms in {xin1 , . . . , xinn } ∪
{xout1 , . . . , x
out
n } ∪ {y1, . . . , yn} \ O
C came as facts in P (P(G))MW ,O and, therefore, they must
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be in any model of P (P(G))MW ,O . Then, the result follows by noticing that P (P(G))MW ,O entails
{yes}∪{ok, ok1, . . . , okn}. Indeed, OC contains by construction one element in the set {xini , xouti }, for
each xi. Therefore, it is possible to entail oki, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ok in turn. Consequently {yes}
must occur in any model of P (P(G))MW ,O .
(ii) Let O be an outlier for P(G). In order to prove the result, some properties of the encoding of G are
discussed.
Property P1: Any witness W for O is such that P (P(G))W |= ok and also that P (P(G))W ,O |= ok.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that ok is not entailed in P (P(G))W . Then, due to
rules r3 and r4, it must be the case that there is a node i such that both xini and xouti are in W .
But, if this is the case, whatever the elements in O are, there is no chance of entailing xini or xouti
in P (P(G))W ,O . Indeed, although stratified logic programs are not monotonic, the monotonicity
property still holds for predicates in the first stratum and the result follows by noting that, except
for the predicate yes, all the other predicates lie in the first stratum of the stratified logic program
P (P(G)). It can be concluded that P (P(G))W ,O |= ¬ok and, hence, P (P(G))W ,O cannot entail
any fact by means of rules whose body contains ok. Given that these rules are those which may lead
to entail facts in the observation components, this is a violation of condition (2) in Definition 1.
Property P2: Any witness W for O is such that P (P(G))W |= unsat.
Proof. After P1 it can be assumed, without loss of generality, that ok is true in P (P(G))W . Before-
hand notice that if xini is in W then yi is in W too, otherwise, xini would be entailed by rule r12 in
P (P(G))W thereby violating condition (1) in Definition 1. Symmetrically, if yi is in W then xini is
in W too, because of rule r11. This means that the body of the rules r11 and r12 are always false in
the program P (P(G))W ,O . Now, assume for the sake of contradiction that unsat is not entailed by
P (P(G))W . As unsat belongs to the first stratum of P (P(G)), then it follows that unsat is also
false in the program P (P(G))W ,O . Then, the only fact among those in P obs(G) that can be entailed
in P (P(G))W ,O is yes that, consequently, must belong to W . But this cannot be the case because if
unsat is false, also P (P(G))W |= yes. Hence, O is not an outlier.
Property P3: Any witness W for O is composed exactly by the fact yes.
Proof. Recall that W is such that ok and unsat are true in P (P(G))W (property P1 and P2 above).
Then, assume that any fact of the form xini , xouti , or yi is in W . In order to satisfy condition (1) in
Definition 1, it must be the case that all the facts having this form are in W , since any fact xini , xouti ,
or yi will suffice for entailing all the others. However, in this case ok is false. Contradiction.
Armed with these properties, it can be concluded that the outlier O must be such that yes is entailed in
the program P (P(G))W ,O , i.e. that both ¬unsat and ok are entailed in the same program. To this aim,
for each node i, either xini or xouti is in O (but not together, because of rule r2), and xini is in O if and
only if yi is in O (because of rules r11 and r12). Furthermore, in order to have unsat not entailed, it
must be the case that the set C = {i | xini 6∈ O} corresponds to a clique, because of the rule r1 (unsat is
entailed as soon as two nodes xi and xj are marked in while being not connected by means of an edge).
The result follows by observing that O with the properties stated above coincides with OC .
In order to conclude the proof, simply observe that given a clique C the corresponding outlier OC is such
that |OC | = n + |{yi | ℓi = in}| = n + n − |C|. Thus, the clique having maximum size is in one-to-one
correspondence with the outlier having minimum size, and computing min(P) amounts to compute the size
of the maximum clique. ✷
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One may ask what is the complexity to be paid to compute the value min(P) for general programs. The
following theorem partially answers the question, by providing an upper bound for it, while leaving it open
an exact characterization of its intrinsic complexity.
Theorem 16. Given a rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, computing the value min(P) (if defined) is
in F∆P3 [O(log n)] (under both brave and cautious semantics), for general P rls.
Proof. The proof is the same as for the membership part in the Theorem 15, except for the fact that
EXISTENCE[k] is feasible in ΣP2 for general logic programs. Then, the binary search can be implemented in
FPΣP2 [O(logn] = F∆P3 [O(log n)]. ✷
Using the result demonstrated above, it is not difficult to see that given a rule-observation pair P, an
outlier of minimum size can be computed in polynomial time using an NP (resp. ΣP2 ) oracle for stratified
(resp. general) logic programs.
Theorem 17. Given a rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, computing an arbitrary outlier O such that
min(P) = |O| (if defined) is
1. in F∆P2 [O(log n)], for stratified P rls, and
2. in F∆P3 [O(log n)] (under both brave and cautious semantics), for general P rls.
Proof. The problem can be solved by (i) computing the value min(P) — it has been seen that this value can
be computed performing O(log |P|) calls to an NP (resp. ΣP2 ) oracle, and then (ii) guessing an outlier O
having size |O| = min(P), together with its witness W , and checking conditions (1) and (2) of Definition
1. Point (ii) above is feasible with an extra NP (resp. ΣP2 ) oracle call for stratified (resp. general) logic
programs. Hence, the following result follows. ✷
One may wonder whether the computation problem is, in fact, complete for the above complexity
classes. Actually, for the case of stratified LPs, the simple membership result can be sharpened by assessing
its precise complexity, which account for the possibility of having several outliers with size min(P). To this
end, it is necessary to recall some further complexity notions.
An NP metric Turing machine MT is a polynomial-time bounded nondeterministic Turing machine
that on every computation branch halts and outputs a binary number. The result computed by MT is the
maximum over all these numbers. The class OptP contains all integer functions that are computed by
an NP metric Turing machine, whereas OptP[O(log n)] is that subclass thereof containing all functions
f whose value f(x) has O(log n) bits, where n = |x|. The class FNP//OptP[O(log n)] contains all (par-
tial) multi-valued functions g for which a polynomially-bounded nondeterministic Turing machine T and
a function h ∈ OptP[O(log n)] exist such that, for every x, T computes the value g(x), provided that
both x and h(x) are taken in input (see [19]). Notice that it is well-known that every multi-valued function
g ∈ FNP//OptP[O(log n)] has a refinement (single-valued) function f ∈ F∆P2 [O(log n)], i.e., for every x it
holds that g(x) is defined iff f(x) is defined and f(x) ∈ g(x). Moreover, a problem (with possibly multiple
solutions for a given instance) is solvable in FNP//OptP[O(log n)] iff any of such solutions is computable in
F∆P2 [O(log n)].
In the light of this observation, the proof of Theorem 17 provides an algorithm for computing a refine-
ment of COMPUTATION[min]; the complexity of COMPUTATION[min] on its own is, instead, more naturally
defined in terms of the class FNP//OptP[O(log n)], where n = |P| is the size of the rule-observation pair, as
shown next.
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Theorem 18. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a stratified rule-observation pair. Then, COMPUTATION[min] is
FNP//OptP[O(log n)]-complete.
Proof. (Membership) The value min(P) has O(log n) many bits at most, where n is the size of the input,
and it can be computed by an NP metric Turing machine. Then, let us guess two sets O and W and verify in
polynomial time that (i) O is an outlier with witness W , and (ii) the size of O is min(P).
(Hardness) A reduction can be shown to the X-MAXIMAL MODEL problem: Given a formula
φ = c1 ∧ . . . ∧ cm in conjunctive normal form on the variables Y = {Y1, ..., Yh} and a subset X ⊆ Y ,
compute a satisfying truth assignment M for φ whose X-part is maximal, i.e., for every other satisfying
assignment M ′ there is a variable in X which is true in M and false in M ′. This problem was proved to
be FNP//OptP[O(log n)]-complete in [19] under the following notion of metric reduction: A problem Π
reduces to a problem Π ′, if there are polynomial-time computable functions f(x) and g(x, y), such that: (i)
for any instance I of Π , f(I) is an instance of Π ′, and f(I) has solution iff I has a solution, and (ii) for any
arbitrary solution S of f(I), g(I, S) is a solution of I .
A rule-observation pair P(φ) = 〈P rls(φ), P obs(φ)〉 is built such that: (i) P obs(φ) contains the two facts
xini , x
out
i for each variable Yi in Y , the fact yi for each variable Yi inX, and the fact yes; (ii) P rls(Φ) consists
of the rules r2, . . . , r12 of the encoding in the proof of Theorem 15, plus the following rule:
r′1 : unsat← ν(tj,1), ν(tj,2), ν(tj,3). 1 ≤ j ≤ m s.t. cj = tj,1 ∨ tj,2 ∨ tj,3
where ν is the following mapping:
ν(t) =
{
xouti , if t = Yi
xini , if t = ¬Yi
Let σ be an assignment for φ. Let us denote by Oσ the set {xℓ11 , . . . , xℓnn } ∪ {yi | ℓi = in ∧ Yi ∈ X},
where each ℓi is in (resp. out) if and only if the variable Yi is not (resp. is) true in σ.
Let us comment the only difference with the encoding used in Theorem 15, i.e., the substitution of rule
r1 with rule r′1. Actually, rule r1 was used to evaluate whether the set of facts of the form xini form a clique:
if the clique is not correctly formed, then unsat is entailed by the program. The behavior of rule r′1 is
symmetric, because the rule checks whether the assignment at hand satisfies the formula: if the assignment
is not satisfying, then unsat is entailed by the program. Provided this modification only, with the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 15, it can be seen that (i) for each satisfying assignment σ, the set Oσ
is an outlier with witness W = {yes} in P(φ); and, (ii) each outlier O in P(φ) is of the form O = Oσ, for
some satisfying assignment σ.
Observe now that given an assignment σ, the corresponding outlier Oσ is such that |Oσ| = n + |{yi |
ℓi = in ∧ Yi ∈ X}|, and recall that ℓi = in means that the variable is false in σ. Hence, the reduction
establishes a one-to-one correspondence not only between outliers and truth assignments for X, but also
between minimum size outliers and the satisfying assignments for φwith a maximum number ofX variables
made true. Clearly, each of such assignments is also an X-MAXIMAL MODEL of φ. The result follows by
observing that the construction can be done in polynomial time. ✷
It is worth pointing out that the reduction presented above is parsimonious [40]. In fact, by letting Y be
the set of all the variables in the formula φ, the theorem above establishes a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween outliers and satisfying assignments. Then, as a side result, the cost of counting the number of outliers
turns out to be the same as the cost of computing the number of satisfying assignments, the archetypical
complete problem for the class #P [82].
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Corollary 2. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a rule-observation pair such that P rls is a stratified. Then, counting
the number of outliers in P is #P-complete.
As with minimal diagnosis applications, an interesting problem is that of singling out an outlier “core”,
that is, those facts that belong to all minimum-size outliers. This apparently difficult problem turns out to be
not more difficult than computing the value of min(P), as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 19. Given a stratified rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 and a fact f , deciding whether, for
each outlier O having minimum size in P, it holds that f ∈ O is ∆P2 [O(log n)]-complete.
Proof. (Membership) The problem can be solved in polynomial time with O(log n) many NP oracle calls.
The value min(P) can be firstly computed by exploiting the algorithm presented in Theorem 15. Then, with
an additional NP oracle it can be checked if there is an outlierO such that (i) |O| = min(P), and (ii) f 6∈ O.
(Hardness) Given a formula φ in conjunctive normal form on the variables Y = {Y1, ..., Yn}, a subset
X ⊆ Y , and a variable Yi, deciding whether Yi is true in all the X-MAXIMUM models is ∆P2 [O(log n)]-
complete, where a model is maximum if it has the largest X-part. The result trivially follows by exploiting
the construction in Theorem 18 that, in fact, relies on a one-to-one correspondence between X-MAXIMUM
models and outliers of minimum size. ✷
5 Observing Rules
The outlier detection framework depicted so far relies on agents’ observations coming as facts that encode
some aspects of the current status of the world. To this aim, it suffices that agents have some “sensing”
capability for monitoring the external environment. However, it would be desirable to have agents that,
besides sensing, would also be able to interact with the environment in a more elaborate way.
For instance, in several multi-agent applications, agents may be involved in dialogues with other agents.
Dialogues may start from the need to achieve an explicit goal, such as to persuade another party, or to find an
information, or to verify an assumption (cf. [86]). Other form of dialogues may occur during a negotiation
[56], i.e., when agents operate in an environment with limited resource availability and their goal is to obtain
a resource (see, e.g., [87, 78]). In this contexts, agents might (maliciously) export knowledge for taking
advantage of its competitor agents and, therefore, it is relevant to have agents equipped with the capability
of having a set of facts and rules to encode their own “observations”, i.e., the knowledge exchanged with
other agents while communicating.
Then, outlier detection techniques can be profitably used for singling out the pieces of knowledge (de-
fined as sets of rules and facts and acquired by communicating with other agents or generally by learning
from the environment) that look anomalous w.r.t. the trustable internal agent view of the world.
Example 5. Consider again the agent AN that is in charge of monitoring the status of the network N .
Assume that AN has no a-priori knowledge about the connectivity, i.e., the rule component PN is empty.
Then, AN might have been informed by another agent of a property about N , which is encoded in the rule
o : up(c)← up(h).
Armed with this rule, the agent monitors the status of the net and observes that h is up but, surprisingly,
c is not. Clearly, there is something strange about these observations. However, in this case the agent might
doubt the fact that h is actually up, but also about the rule o, which has been observed, but is not part of its
trustable knowledge. ⊳
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In order to study this extended framework, it is necessary to introduce some changes in the basic def-
inition. Let P rls be a logic program encoding general knowledge about the world, and let P e−obs be a
set of facts and rules encoding some observed aspects of the current status of the world, called extended
observation component. Then, the structure P = 〈P rls, P e−obs〉 is an extended rule-observation pair.
It is worth noting that, in this novel context, the type of the logic program P (P) is determined by the
rule program together with the extended observation set.
It is easy to see that the complexity of the outlier detection problems studied so far remains unchanged
for extended rule-observation pairs where P (P) is a stratified or a general logic program. Indeed, all the
hardness proofs refer to P obs including facts only (and hence hold in the extended framework) and all the
membership results can easily accommodate rules in the observations (belonging to the same class of logic
programs to which Prls belongs to) without additional costs.
However, it is interesting to study what happens in the case of positive rule components, for which
Theorem 1 showed that no outlier exists if observations are restricted to be facts. To analyze this scenario,
it is first made clear that a rule r is entailed by a positive program P if r is satisfied by the unique minimal
model M of P .
Surprisingly, Theorem 1 does not hold for the case of extended rule-observation pairs. For instance, one
can consider the extended rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P e−obs〉 with P rls = ∅ and P e−obs = {a ←
b, b}. Then b is an outlier with witness a ← b. Indeed P (P){b},{a←b} 6|= ¬(a ← b), while P (P){a←b} |=
¬(a← b).
Thus, in the following, the computational complexity of the EXISTENCE problem is stated when ex-
tended rule-observation pairs are considered. This result helps in understanding the characteristics of de-
tecting outliers over extended pairs — complexity figures for the other problems introduced in the paper
(such as OUTLIER−CHECKING, WITNESS−CHECKING and OW−CHECKING) can be then obtained by simple
adaptations of analogous proofs shown for the standard case, and are, therefore, omitted.
Theorem 20. Let P = 〈P rls, P e−obs〉 be an extended rule-observation pair. Then EXISTENCE is
1. NP-complete, for positive and stratified P (P),6 and
2. ΣP2 -complete (under both brave and cautious semantics), for general P (P).
Proof.
1. Membership can be proven with the same line of reasoning as the proof of Theorem 2. Therefore,
let us focus on the hardness which shall be proved for positive P (P). Consider a Boolean formula in
conjunctive normal form Φ = c1∧ . . .∧ cm over the variables x1, . . . , xn, such that each clause contains
at most three distinct (positive or negated) variables.
An extended rule-observation pair P(Φ) = 〈P rls(Φ), P e−obs(Φ)〉 is defined such that: (i) P e−obs(Φ)
contains exactly the fact xTi and xFi for each variable xi in Φ, plus the rule ok ← sat; (ii) P rls(Φ) is
cj ← π(tj,1).
cj ← π(tj,2).
cj ← π(tj,3).

 ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m, s.t. cj = tj,1 ∨ tj,2 ∨ tj,3
sat← c1, ..., cm.
ok ← xTi , x
F
i . ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
6 We thank one of the anonymous referees for having suggested this result and its proof.
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where π is the mapping:
π(t) =
{
xTi , if t = xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
xFi , if t = ¬xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Clearly, P (Φ) is positive and can be built in polynomial time. Now it is shown that Φ is satisfiable ⇔
there is an outlier in P(Φ).
(⇒) Suppose that Φ is satisfiable, and take one of its satisfying truth assignments, say σ, for the variables
x1, . . . , xn. Consider the sets Wσ = {ok ← sat} ∪ {xTi | xi is false in σ} ∪ {xFi | xi is true in σ}
andOσ = P e−obs\Wσ . It is now shown thatOσ is an outlier with witnessWσ. Indeed, the program
P (P(Φ))Wσ does not entail ok, because for each variable xi either xTi or xFi is evaluated true.
Moreover, it entails sat, because of the construction ofWσ and of the fact that the encoding evaluates
the truth values of the assignment σ, which is satisfying. Thus, P (P(Φ))Wσ |= ¬(ok ← sat), and
condition (1) in Definition 1 is satisfied. As for condition (2) in Definition 1, it is sufficient to observe
that P (P(Φ))Wσ ,Oσ coincides with P (P(Φ))P e−obs(Φ); therefore, the program contains no fact and
both sat and ok are evaluated false. Thus, P (P(Φ))Wσ ,Oσ |= (ok ← sat).
(⇐) Assume that there is an outlier O with witness W in P(Φ). It is shown that Φ is satisfiable. To this
aim, notice that the rule (ok ← sat) must be part of W , because ok and sat are the only facts that
can be entailed in the encoding. Then, because of condition (1) in Definition 1, it must be the case
that P (P(Φ))W |= ¬(ok ← sat), i.e., P (P(Φ))W must entail sat and not ok. By the fact that ok is
not entailed, it can be concluded that for each variable xi, at least one element in the set {xTi , xFi }
is in W . Therefore, W assigns a truth value to some of the variables of Φ and may leave undefined
some other variables (those variables whose corresponding facts have been both in W). Formally,
a (partial) assignment σ for the variables in Φ can be defined such that if xFi (resp. xTi ) is in W ,
then xi is true (resp. false) in σ. Then, by the fact that sat is entailed, it must be the case that σ is
satisfying.
2. The proof is similar to that of Theorems 3 and 4. ✷
6 Implementing Outliers Detection Problems
Now that the framework for outlier detection has been illustrated and its complexity has been investigated,
attention can be focused on the problem of devising effective strategies for its implementation. Specifically,
sound and complete algorithms are exhibited that transform any rule-observation pair P into a suitable logic
program L(P) such that its stable models are in a one-to-one correspondence with outliers in P.
The most interesting aspect of this transformation is that, since stable models represent the solution
of the outlier problems, it is possible to implement a prototype tool for finding outliers with the support
of efficient stable models engines such as GnT [49], DLV [61] and Smodels [67]. In fact, reformulations
in terms of logic programs under stable model semantics have been already exploited in the literature for
prototypically implementing other reasoning tasks such as abduction (see, e.g., [51, 35]), planning (see, e.g.,
[81, 80]), and diagnosis (see, e.g., [23, 29]).
6.1 Stratified Pairs
In this section, the case of a pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 is considered such that P rls is a stratified logic program.
The rewriting algorithm OutlierDetectionToStableModels is shown in Figure 5. It takes in input the pair P,
and outputs a logic program L(P), which is built according to the following ideas.
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Input: A stratified rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, where P obs = {obs1, ...,obsn};
Output: A logic program L(P);
Method: Perform the following steps:
1. L(P) := ∅;
2. /*———- Rule part rewriting ———-*/
for each rule r ∈ P rls of the form a ← b1, · · · , bk, not c1, · · · , not cn, insert into L(P) the rules
(a) aC1 ← bC11 , · · · , bC1k , not cC11 , · · · , not cC1n .
(b) aC2 ← bC21 , · · · , bC2k , not cC21 , · · · , not cC2n .
3. /*———- Outlier and witness guessing ———-*/
for each obsi ∈ P obs, insert into L(P) the rules
(a) oi ← not oi. oi ← not oi.
(b) wi ← not wi. wi ← not wi.
4. /*———- Observations definition ———-*/
for each obsi ∈ P obs, insert into L(P) the rules
(a) obsC2i ← not oi, not wi.
(b) obsC1i ← not wi.
5. /*———- Outlier and witness checking ———-*/
for each obsi ∈ P obs, insert into L(P) the rules
(a) badC1 ← wi, obsC1i .
(b) satC2 ← wi, obsC2i .
6. /*———- Constraints ———-*/
(a) for each obsi ∈ P obs, insert into L(P) the rule s1 ← oi, wi, not s1.
(b) insert into L(P) the rule s2 ← not satC2, not s2.
(c) if P rls is stratified then insert into L(P) the rule s3 ← badC1, not s3.
Fig. 5. Algorithm OutlierDetectionToStableModels.
First of all, a suitable rewriting of P rls is inserted into L(P). Let us denote by S[L] the rewriting of
a set S of rules obtained by substituting each atom p occurring in S with the new atom pL. Then, the
algorithm inserts in the Step 2 the programs P rls[C1] and P rls[C2]. Intuitively, P rls[C1] is used for checking
condition (1) in Definition 1, while P rls[C2] is used for checking condition (2) in the same definition.
Rules inserted in Step 3 serve the purpose to guess an outlier and its associated witness. Each fact obsi
in P obs is associated with two new facts oi and wi, where, intuitively, oi (resp. wi) being true in a model
means that obsi belongs to an outlier (resp. witness) in P. In other words, truth values of facts oi and wi in
any model for L(P) univocally define an outlier and a witness set for it, respectively.
Rules inserted in Step 4 serve the purpose of introducing in the program L(P) the rewriting P obsW [C1] and
P obsO,W [C2], in order to simulate the removal of the outlier and the witness from the set P obs which is needed
for verifying whether both conditions in Definition 1 are satisfied. For each atom p in the set of observations
P obs, two rules are introduced. In particular, rule 4.(a) guarantees that obsC2i is true in the program if it is
neither an outlier nor a witness. Similarly, 4.(b) guarantees that obsC1i is true if wi is not.
Rules inserted in Step 5 evaluate conditions (1) and (2) in Definition 1. Indeed, the atom satC2 is
evaluated true if a fact obsC2i is true even if assumed to belong to a witness (wi true), i.e., if condition (2) in
Definition 1 is satisfied in the model. Similarly badC1 is true if obsC1i is true but obsi belongs to a witness
(wi true), i.e., if condition (1) is not satisfied in the model.
Summarizing, the subprogram of L(P) built in Steps 1-5 is such that it guesses the values for each oi
and wi and verifies that both conditions in Definition 1 are satisfied.
In order to finalize the transformation, it is necessary to add some constraints (Step 6). The rules inserted
in Step 6 have the form sj ← a, not sj. As sj does not appear in any other rule of the program L(P), then
it must be false in any stable model of L(P). Thus, these rules act as constraints imposing that a must be
false in all the models. Therefore, rules inserted in step 6.(a) impose that any obsi cannot be an outlier and
witness at the same time, the rule added in step 6.(b) imposes that interest is only in stable models in which
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satC2 is true, and, finally, the rule added in step 6.(c) imposes that interest is only in stable models in stable
models in which badC1 is false.
The correctness of the algorithm is proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 21. Let P = 〈P rls, P obs〉 be a stratified rule-observation pair, and let L(P) be the rewriting
obtained by the algorithm in Figure 5. Then,
1. for each outlier O with witness W in P, there is a stable model M of L(P) such that {obsi | oi ∈
M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈M} =W , and
2. for each stable model M of L(P), there is an outlier O with witness W in P, such that {obsi | oi ∈
M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈M} =W .
Proof.
1. Let O be an outlier with witness W in P. Let M1 denote the stable model of the program P (P)W ,
and M2 denote the stable model of the program P (P)W ,O . Consider the interpretations IC1 = {aC1 |
a ∈ M1}, I
C2 = {aC2 | a ∈ M2}, I
guess = {oi | obsi ∈ O} ∪ {oi | obsi 6∈ O} ∪ {wi | obsi ∈
W} ∪ {wi | obsi 6∈ W}, and Iobs = {obsC1i | obsi 6∈ W} ∪ {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (O ∪ W)}, and let
M = IC1 ∪ IC2 ∪ Iguess ∪ Iobs ∪ {satC2} be an interpretation of L(P).
Now, it is shown that M is a stable model of L(P) such that {obsi | oi ∈ M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈
M} =W . To this aim, notice that by construction:
– {obsi | oi ∈M} = O, because oi is in M if and only if obsi is in O; and
– {obsi | wi ∈M} =W , because wi is in M if and only if obsi is in W .
Therefore, it remains to show that M is a stable model of L(P), i.e., that it is the minimal model of the
positive program L(P)M . To this aim, let P i denote the program consisting of the rules added in the i-th
step of the algorithm, and observe preliminary that L(P)M is the program (P rls[C1] ∪ {obsC1i | obsi 6∈
W})M∪ (P rls[C2] ∪ {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (O ∪W)})
M∪ (P 3)M ∪ (P 5)M ∪ (P 6)M , where (by applying
the definition of reduct):
A : (P rls[C1] ∪ {obsC1i | obsi 6∈ W})
M = (P (P)W [C1])
IC1
.
Indeed, by definition, P (P)W [C1] is the program P rls[C1] ∪ {obsC1i | obsi 6∈ W}. Moreover,
all the predicates in such a program have the form pC1, where p is a predicate symbol in P (P).
Therefore, (P (P)W [C1])M = (P (P)W [C1])I
C1∪{obsC1i |obsi 6∈W}, and the result follows because
{obsC1i | obsi 6∈ W} is a subset of IC1. To see why the last containment holds, recall that IC1
is a renaming of the model M1 which must contain all the observations that are not in W , by con-
struction.
B : (P rls[C2] ∪ {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (W ∪O)})
M = (P (P)W ,O[C2])
IC2
.
Indeed, it can be applied the same line of reasoning of point A above.
C : (P 3)M = {p. | p is an atom in Iguess}.
D : (P 5)M = {badC1← wi, obs
C1
i . | obsi ∈ P
obs} ∪ {satC2← wi, obs
C2
i .}.
E : (P 6)M = {s1 ← oi, wi. | obsi ∈ P
obs} ∪ {s3 ← badC1.}.
Then, the result follows because of the following two properties:
Property P1: M is model of L(P)M .
Proof. All the rules in L(P)M (see points A− E above) are satisfied by M :
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– Rules in A are satisfied by M . Indeed, program P (P)W [C1] coincides with P (P)W modulo a
renaming of the predicate symbols, and IC1 is in fact a renaming of the unique stable model
M1 of P (P)W , by construction. Then, the result follows since M1 is, by definition, the minimal
model of the positive program P (P)M1W .
– Rules in B are satisfied by M . Indeed, program P (P)W ,O[C2] coincides with P (P)W ,O modulo
a renaming of the predicate symbols, and IC2 is in fact a renaming of the unique stable modelM2
of P (P)W ,O , by construction. Then, the result follows since M2 is, by definition, the minimal
model of the positive program P (P)M2W ,O .
– Rules in C are satisfied by M since Iguess is a subset of M .
– Rules in D are satisfied by M . Indeed, as for rules of the form {badC1← wi, obsC1i . | obsi ∈
P obs}, notice that, by construction of Iguess, wi is in M if and only if obsi ∈ W . Moreover, it
is claimed that obsC1i is in M if and only if obsi 6∈ W , thereby having that the body of all such
rules is always evaluated false by M . To see why the claim holds, observe that if obsi 6∈ W
then obsC1i is in M by construction. Let us now assume that there is a fact obsi in W and, for
the sake of contradiction, that obsC1i is in M as well. It follows that obsC1i is in IC1 and, hence,
that obsi belongs to M1 by construction of the set IC1. But this is impossible because W is an
outlier and, therefore, is such that all the facts in the witness set do not occur in the unique stable
model M1 of P (P)W .
Moreover, as for the rules of the form {satC2← wi, obsC2i .}, they are satisfied by M because
satC2 is in M .
– Rules inE are satisfied byM . Indeed, rules in the set {s1 ← oi, wi. | obsi ∈ P obs} are satisfied
by construction of the set Iguess, which is in fact such that wi is in M if and only if obsi ∈ W ,
and such that oi is in M if and only if obsi ∈ O. Then, given that by definition W∩O = ∅, the
body of such rules is always evaluated false in M . To conclude, rule s3 ← badC1. is satisfied
by M because badC1 is not in M .
Property P2: There is no model M ′ of L(P)M such that M ′ ⊂M .
Proof. Recall that program L(P)M has the form shown in points A− E above and assume, for the
sake of contradiction, that there exists a model M ′ ⊂M forL(P)M . First, observe that Iguess ⊆M ′
(see point C). Moreover, because of the fact that {obsC1i | obsi 6∈ W} is a subset of IC1 and that
{obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (W ∪ O)} is a subset of IC2 (points A and B, respectively), it can be observed
that M has in fact the form IC1 ∪ IC2 ∪ Iguess ∪ {satC2}. Thus, the following scenarios can be
distinguished:
(a) Assume that IC1 ∩M ′ ⊂ IC1. Then, IC1 ∩M ′ is a model for (P rls[C1] ∪ {obsC1i | obsi 6∈
W})I
C1
, i.e., for (P (P)W [C1])I
C1
. It follows that the set M ′1 = {a | aC1 ∈ (IC1 ∩M ′)} is
a model for P (P)M1W as well (notice that (P (P)W [C1])I
C1
coincides with P (P)M1W modulo the
renaming of predicate symbols). However, M ′1 is also a subset of M1, and this is impossible
because M1 is the stable model of P (P)W and, therefore, the minimal model of P (P)M1W .
(b) Assume that IC2 ∩M ′ ⊂ IC2. Then, IC2 ∩M ′ is a model for (P rls[C2] ∪ {obsC2i | obsi 6∈
(O∪W)})I
C2
, i.e., for (P (P)W ,O[C2])I
C2
. It follows that the set M ′2 = {a | aC2 ∈ (IC2∩M ′)}
is also a model for P (P)M2W ,O (notice that (P (P)W ,O[C2])I
C2
coincides with P (P)M2W ,O modulo
the renaming of predicate symbols). However, M ′2 is also a subset of M2, and this is impossible
because M2 is the stable model of P (P)W ,O and, therefore, the minimal model of P (P)M2W ,O .
(c) Assume that satC2 is not in M ′. Then, after (a) and (b) above, it is the case that M ′ = IC1 ∪
IC2 ∪ Iguess. Then, since satC2 is not in M ′, because of the rules added in Step 5.(b), it holds
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that for each wi in M ′, obsC2i is not in M ′. Hence, by construction of Iguess, it follows that
for each obsi in W , it is the case that obsC2i is not in IC2. However, IC2 is a renaming of the
model M2 of P (P)W ,O. Therefore, the model M2 does not entail any fact in W . But this is a
contradiction with condition (2) in Definition 1.
2. LetM be a stable model ofL(P). First of all, note that by rules inserted intoL(P) in Step 6 of algorithm,
M is such that (i) for each letter obsi in P obs, oi and wi cannot belong simultaneously to M , (ii)
satC2 ∈M , and (iii) badC1 6∈ M . Furthermore, by rules inserted into L(P) in Steps 3.(a) and 3.(b) it
is the case that, for each letter obsi in P rls, either oi or oi and either wi or wi belong to M .
Consider, now, the disjoint sets O = {obsi | oi ∈M} and W = {obsi | wi ∈M}. It has to be shown
that both conditions in Definition 1 are satisfied. To this aim consider the interpretation Iguess = {oi |
obsi ∈ O} ∪ {oi | obsi 6∈ O} ∪ {wi | obsi ∈ W} ∪ {wi | obsi 6∈ W}, and notice that M can be
written as IC1 ∪ IC2 ∪ Iguess ∪ {satC2}, where IC1 and IC2 are the subsets of M containing all the
predicates of the form pC1 and pC2, respectively. At this point, the reader may check that rules in L(P)M
have again the form illustrated in points A− E above.
Given that M is a minimal model of L(P)M , it follows that IC1 is a minimal model of (P rls[C1] ∪
{obsC1i | obsi 6∈ W})
M = (P (P)W [C1])
IC1
, and IC2 is a minimal model of (P rls[C2] ∪ {obsC2i |
obsi 6∈ (W ∪O)})
M = (P (P)W ,O[C2])
IC2
. Then, M1 = {a | aC1 ∈ IC1} is a minimal model of PM1W
and M2 = {a | aC2 ∈ IC2} is a minimal model of PM2W ,O. Therefore, M1 (resp., M2) is the stable model
of PW (resp., PW ,O).
To conclude, the following properties can be shown:
• P (P)W |= ¬W .
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is a fact obsi in W such that P (P)W |=
obsi. Then, obsi must belong to the unique stable model M1, and obsC1i must belong to IC1.
However, wi belongs to M by construction, and therefore by rule 5.(a) badC1 is in M , which is
impossible.
• P (P)W ,O 6|= ¬W .
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that for each fact obsi in W , P (P)W ,O |= ¬obsi.
Then, the unique stable model M2 does not contain any fact in W , and symmetrically IC2 does not
contain any fact of the form obsC2i , with obsi in W . Then, satC2 is not in M because of the rule
5.(b), which is impossible. ✷
Minimum-size Outliers In order to translate detection problems aiming at singling out minimum-size
outliers into a suitable logic program, an approach will be exploited which was used, for instance, in the
DLV system and relying on extending classic logic programming by introducing weak constraints.
Weak constraints, taking the form of rules such as :∼ b1, · · · , bk, not bk+1, · · · , not bk+m, express a
set of desired conditions that may be however violated; their informal semantics is to minimize the number
of violated instances. In fact, in [17] it is proved that the introduction of weak constraints allows the solu-
tion of optimization problems since each weak constraint can be regarded as an “objective function” of an
optimization problem.
Given a program P ∪W where P is a set of rules and W a set of weak constraints, an interpretation M
is a stable model for P ∪W if M is a stable model for P . The stable models of P ∪W are ordered w.r.t.
the number of weak constraints that are not satisfied: best stable models are those which minimize such a
number [17].
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Example 6. Given a graph G = 〈V,E〉, denoted by the unary predicate node and the binary predicate edge,
we can model the MAX CLIQUE problem, asking for the clique of G having maximum size, by means of the
following program:
c(X)← not nc(X), node(X).
nc(X)← not c(X), node(X).
p← c(X), c(Y), X 6= Y, not edge(X, Y), not p.
:∼ nc(X).
where the first two rules are used for creating all the possible partitions of nodes into c and nc, the third one
is used for ensuring that nodes in c forms a clique, i.e., each pair of nodes in c is connected by an edge, while
the weak constraint minimizes the number of vertices that are not in the clique, or equivalently it maximizes
the size of the clique. Then, the best stable models are in one-to-one correspondence with maximum-size
cliques in G. ⊳
Thus, the algorithm in Figure 5 can be modified by inserting the constraint :∼ oi. into L(P), for each
obsi ∈ P
obs
. Then, letting L∼(P) be the transformed program resulting from applying the modified algo-
rithm, we have that minimum-size outliers in P are in one-to-one correspondence with best stable models
of L∼(P).
Theorem 22. Let P = 〈Prls,Pobs〉 be a stratified rule-observation pair. Then,
1. for each minimum-size outlier O with witness W in P, there is a best stable model M of L∼(P) such
that {obsi | oi ∈M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈M} =W , and
2. for each best stable model M of L∼(P), there is an outlier O with witness W in P, such that {obsi |
oi ∈M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈M} =W .
Proof. Given a rule-observation pair P, L∼(P) = L(P) ∪ {:∼ oi. | obsi ∈ P obs}, where the stable
models of the program L(P) are in one-to-one correspondence with outliers in P (Theorem 5).
By definition, each model M in SM(L(P)) is also a model of L∼(P). Moreover, M is a best model
if it minimizes the number of violated constraints, i.e., if there is no other model M ′ containing a fewer
number of atoms of the form oi. The result follows by noticing that this number is, in fact, the size of the
outlier O constructed in the proof of Theorem 5. ✷
6.2 General Pairs
Next let us consider the case of general rule-observation pairs. In this case, it should be pointed out the con-
straint imposed by rule 6.(c) would not suffice for ensuring the satisfaction of condition (1) in Definition 1.
Indeed, the outlier detection problems turned out to be complete for the second level of the polynomial hi-
erarchy for general rule-observation pairs, while any polynomial time transformation into a logic program
under stable model semantics may encode problems complete for the first level only.
In order to deal with this problem, a more powerful logic formalism must be exploited, while keeping the
size of the encoding polynomially-bounded in the size of the rule-observation pair. Specifically, the solution
relies on a rewriting into a disjunctive logic program accounting for outliers under the cautious semantics.
Actually, a similar rewriting for brave semantics can be obtained as well.
Recall that disjunctive programs allow clauses to have both disjunction (denoted by ∨) in their heads
and negation in their bodies. In more detail, a disjunctive rule r is a clause of the form: a1 ∨ · · · ∨ am ←
b1, · · · , bk, not c1, · · · , not cn where n, k,m ≥ 0, n + k +m > 0 and a1, · · · , am, b1, · · · , bk, c1, · · · , cn
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are atoms. The disjunction a1 ∨ · · · ∨ am, also denoted by h(r), is the head of r, while the conjunction
b1, . . . , bk, not c1, · · · , not cn, also denoted by b(r), is the body of r.
Given an interpretation I for a disjunctive program P , the value of the disjunction D = a1 ∨ · · · ∨ am
w.r.t. I is valueI(D) = max({valueI(ai) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}). Similarly to the case of non-disjunctive programs,
a ground rule r is satisfied by I if valueI(h(r)) ≥ valueI(b(r)) and models of P are defined to be the
interpretations that satisfy all the ground rules of P . Then, the model-theoretic semantics of disjunctive
programs is defined as follows.
For a positive disjunctive program P (i.e., rules in P do not contain negation in the body), the semantics
is given in terms of the set its minimal models, denoted by MM(P )7. Moreover, for a general disjunctive
program P , the stable model semantics [42] assigns to P the set SM(P ) of its stable models defined as
suitable extension of stable models for disjunction-free programs. In particular, let P be a disjunctive logic
program and let I be an interpretation for P . Then, P I denotes the ground positive program derived from
ground(P ) by (1) removing all rules that contain a negative literal not a in the body and a ∈ I , and
(2) removing all negative literals from the remaining rules. An interpretation M is a stable model for P if
and only if M ∈ MM(PM ). Under this semantics, disjunctive programs allow to solve problems that are
complete for the complexity class ΣP2 (see, e.g., [24]).
The algorithm OutlierDetectionToDisjunctiveStableModels is shown in Figure 6. To illustrate, step 2
inserts two suitable rewriting of P rls into L∨(P ). One of the two rewriting consists of a renaming of the
original program P rls, call it P rls[C2] (see rules 2.(b)). Analogously to the rewriting shown for stratified
pairs, P rls[C2] serves the purpose of checking condition (2) of Definition 1.
Instead, the task of checking condition (1) is demanded to rules inserted in Steps 2.(a), 4.(b), 7, 8, and 9
— recall that, under the cautious form of entailing, this check consists in verifying that each stable model of
P (P)W does not contain some atom in W . Intuitively this is carried out as follows. First, in order to encode
the stable models of the program P (P)W , for each atom p occurring in P (P), the atoms pC1 and pC1 are
used: the atom pC1 (resp. pC1) being true in an interpretation of L∨(P ) means that the atom p is true (resp.
false) in a stable model of P (P)W . Then, the atom satC1 is used to check whether the truth values for
the atoms of the form pC1 and pC1 correctly encode a stable model for P (P)W and satisfy condition (1) in
Definition 1. Specifically, by rule 2.(a), satC1 is entailed by the rewriting as soon as the atoms of the form
pC1 and pC1 do not satisfy some rule in P (P)W . Clearly, this is only a necessary condition for these atoms
encoding a stable model for P (P)W , and details on the encoding of some further conditions are provided
below.
Steps 3 and 4 of algorithm OutlierDetectionToDisjunctiveStableModels are similar to Steps 3 and 4 of
algorithm OutlierDetectionToStableModels described above. Specifically, rule 4.(b) entails satC1 whenever
an atom of the form obsC1i comes true in the stable model of P (P)W while not being part of the witness
set. Therefore, this rule guarantees that the truth values for the atoms of the form pC1 and pC1 consistently
encode the observations that do not belong to the witness set.
Rules inserted in subsequent Step 5 evaluate the conditions of Definition 1. Indeed, the atom satC2 is
true if a fact obsC2i is true even if assumed to belong to a witness (wi true), i.e. if condition (2) in Definition 1
is satisfied in the model, while the atom satC1 is true if, for each fact obsi ∈ P obs, either (step 5.(a)) obsi
is not assumed to belong to a witness (wi true) or (step 5.(b)) obsi is assumed to belong to a witness (wi
true) and obsC1i is true, i.e. if the witness set is not entailed in the model (cf. condition (1) in Definition 1).
7 Differently from disjunction-free positive programs, positive disjunctive programs have more than one minimal model. Hence,
for simplicity and by a little abuse of notation, in the following MM(P ) will denote a set of minimal models rather than a
single minimal model.
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Input: A rule-observation pair P = 〈P rls, P obs〉, where P obs = {obs1, ...,obsn};
Output: A disjunctive logic program L∨(P);
Method: Perform the following steps:
1. L(P) := ∅;
2. /*———- Rule part rewriting ———-*/
for each rule r ∈ P rls of the form a ← b1, · · · , bk, not c1, · · · , not cm, insert into L∨(P) the rule
(a) satC1 ← aC1, bC11 , · · · , bC1k , cC11 , · · · , cC1m .
(b) aC2 ← bC21 , · · · , bC2k , not cC21 , · · · , not cC2m .
3. /*———- Outlier and witness guessing ———-*/
for each obsi ∈ P obs, insert into L∨(P) the rules
(a) oi ← not oi. oi ← not oi.
(b) wi ← not wi. wi ← not wi.
4. /*———- Observations definition ———-*/
for each obsi ∈ P obs, insert into L∨(P) the rules
(a) obsC2i ← not oi, not wi.
(b) satC1 ← obsC1i , wi.
5. /*———- Outlier and witness checking ———-*/
for each obsi ∈ P obs, insert into L∨(P) the rules
(a) satC1i ← wi.
(b) satC1i ← wi, obsC1i .
(c) satC2 ← wi, obsC2i .
insert into L∨(P) the rule satC1 ← satC11, . . . , satC1n.
6. /*———- Constraints ———-*/
(a) insert into L∨(P) the rule satC1 ← not satC1.
(b) insert into L∨(P) the rule satC2 ← not satC2.
(c) for each obsi ∈ P obs, insert into L∨(P) the rule s ← oi, wi, not s.
7. /*———- Checking Condition (1): guessing an interpretation, mapping φ and rule assignment ———-*/
for each atom p ∈ P rls ∪ P obs, insert into L∨(P) the rules
(a) pC1 ∨ pC1.
(b) pφ1 ∨ ... ∨ pφs ← pC1. (where s is the number of predicate symbols in Lit(P rls) ∪ P obs)
(c) pr1 ∨ ... ∨ prℓ ← pC1. (where r1, ..., rℓ are the rules in P rls ∪ P obs in which p occurs in the head)
8. /*———- Checking Condition (1): constraints ———-*/
for each atom p in P rls ∪ P obs insert into L∨(P) the rules
(a) satC1 ← pC1, pC1.
(b) satC1 ← pφi, pφj, pC1. (for each i, j ∈ {1, ...,s}, with i 6= j)
(c) satC1 ← pri, prj, pC1. (for each i, j ∈ {1, ..., ℓ}, with i 6= j)
(d) satC1 ← pri, wj, pC1. (if ri is a fact in P obs asserting the atom obsj = p)
(e) satC1 ← pri, cC1, pC1. (for each atom c occurring negatively in the body of ri)
(f) satC1 ← pri, bC1, pC1. (for each atom b occurring positively in the body of ri)
(g) satC1 ← pri, pφh, qφk, pC1. (for each atom q occurring positively in the body of ri, and for each h ≤ k)
9. /*———- Checking Condition (1): saturation ———-*/
for each atom p in P rls ∪ P obs insert into L∨(P) the rules
(a) pC1 ← satC1.
(b) pC1 ← satC1.
(c) pφi ← satC1. (for each i ∈ {1, ...,s})
(d) pri ← satC1. (for each rule ri in which p occurs in the head)
insert into L∨(P) the rule
(e) satC1i ← satC1. (for each atom of the form satC1i)
Fig. 6. Algorithm OutlierDetectionToDisjunctiveStableModels.
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Step 6 add rules which are similar to the constraints of the algorithm in Figure 5. In fact, these rules
impose that the interest is in stable models in which both satC1 and satC2 are true, and that obsi cannot
belong to an outlier and a witness at the same time.
The main differences w.r.t. the case of stratified rule-observation pairs are in steps 7, 8 and 9. Indeed,
unlike stratified logic programs, general logic programs may have more than one stable model and, hence,
under cautious semantics, rules inserted in Step 5 do not suffice to check condition (1) in Definition 1.
Specifically, rules inserted in Step 9 are such that if a stable model M of L∨(P ) contains satC1, then it
must also contain all the atoms of the form pC1 and pC1 — actually, these rules infer also other atoms, namely
satC1i, pφ
i and pri, whose necessity will be clear in a while. Intuitively, since by rule 6.(a) satC1 must
belong to any model of the program L∨(P ), a necessary condition for M to be a minimal model of L∨(P )M
is that, for each subset M ′ of M being a model of L∨(P )M , M ′ entails satC1 in its turn. Due to the rules
inserted in step 7.(a) and 8.(a), each model M ′ ⊂ M contains a guess of a model of P (P)W . Hence, by
looking at rule 2.(a) and rules in Step 5, it would be concluded that the minimality of M guarantees that
there is no model of P (P)W that does not satisfy condition (1).
However, the check that the models of P (P)W do not satisfy condition (1) must be restricted to its stable
models only (ignoring models that are not stable and that do not satisfy condition (1)). This is precisely the
purpose of the rules in Step 7 and 8. Specifically, the intended meaning of the rules 7.(b), 7.(c) and the rules
inserted in Step 8 is to check for the minimality of M ′ (w.r.t. L∨(P )M ) so that satC1 is entailed whenever
M ′ is not minimal. To this aim, a well-known characterization of minimal models for positive programs is
exploited (indeed, the reduct of P (P)W w.r.t. an interpretation is a positive program), which is formalized
below for the reader’s convenience.
Lemma 1. (cf. [88], Theorem 2.7) Let P be a (non-disjunctive) positive propositional logic program, and
let M be a model for it. Then, M is minimal if and only if there is a function φ assigning a natural number
to each atom occurring in P , and a function r assigning a rule of P to each element in M such that:
1. b(r(p)) ⊆M ,
2. h(r(p)) = p, and
3. φ(q) < φ(p), for each q ∈ b(r(p)).
Accordingly, to assess the minimality of the model at hand, rules 7.(b) and 7.(c) guess for each atom p,
an assignment to a natural number (p is assigned to i iff pφi is true in the model), and a rule (exactly a rule
rj having p occurring in its head is assigned to p iff prj is true in the model), while rules added in Step 8
checks whether the assignments are correct, i.e., whether they satisfy all the conditions in Lemma 1.
The following theorem accounts for the correctness of the algorithm.
Theorem 23. Let P = 〈Prls,Pobs〉 be a rule-observation pair, and let L∨(P) be the rewriting obtained by
the algorithm in Figure 6. Then,
1. for each outlier O with witness W in P, there is a stable model M of L∨(P) such that {obsi | oi ∈
M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈M} =W , and
2. for each stable model M of L∨(P), there is an outlier O with witness W in P, such that {obsi | oi ∈
M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈M} =W .
Proof.
1. Let O be an outlier with witness W in P. Let M2 denote the stable model of the program P (P)W ,O
which entails an element in W (notice that such a model exists in order to satisfy condition (2) in
45
Definition 1). Consider the interpretations IC1 = {aC1, aC1 | a is an atom in P rls ∪ P obs}, IC2 =
{aC2 | a ∈ M2}, I
guess = {oi | obsi ∈ O} ∪ {oi | obsi 6∈ O} ∪ {wi | obsi ∈ W} ∪
{wi | obsi 6∈ W}, I
obs = {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (O ∪ W)}, I
φ = {pφi | p is an atom in P rls ∪
P obs, 1 ≤ i ≤ s} (where s denotes the number of distinct predicates in P rls ∪ P obs), and Ir = {prj |
rj is a rule in P rls ∪ P obs such that h(rj) = p}, and let M = IC1 ∪ IC2 ∪ Iguess ∪ Iobs ∪ Iφ ∪ Ir ∪
{satC2, satC1, satC1i, ..., satC1n} be an interpretation of L∨(P).
Now, it is shown that M is a stable model of L∨(P) such that {obsi | oi ∈M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈
M} =W . To this aim, notice that by construction:
– {obsi | oi ∈M} = O, because oi is in M if and only if obsi is in O; and
– {obsi | wi ∈M} =W , because wi is in M if and only if obsi is in W .
Therefore, it remains to show that M is a stable model of L∨(P), i.e., that it is the minimal model of
the positive program L∨(P)M . To this aim, let PC1 denote the program composed by rules added in
steps 2.(a) and 4.(b) of the algorithm, and let P i denote the program consisting of the rules added in the
i-th step of the algorithm, and observe preliminary that L∨(P)M is the program (PC1)M∪ (P rls[C2] ∪
{obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (O ∪ W)})
M∪ (P 3)M ∪ (P 5)M ∪ (P 6)M ∪ (P 7)M ∪ (P 8)M ∪ (P 9)M , where (by
applying the definition of reduct):
A : (PC1)M = PC1.
Indeed, by definition PC1 is a positive program, and therefore coincides with its reduct.
B : (P rls[C2] ∪ {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (W ∪O)})
M = (P (P)W ,O[C2])
IC2
.
Indeed, by definition, P (P)W ,O[C2] is the program P rls[C2] ∪ {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (W ∪ O)}. More-
over, all the predicates in this program have the form pC2, where p is a predicate symbol in P (P).
Therefore, (P (P)W ,O[C2])M = (P (P)W ,O[C2])I
C2∪{obsC2i |obsi 6∈(W∪O)}, and the result follows be-
cause {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (W ∪ O)} is a subset of IC2. To see why the last containment hold, recall
that IC2 is a renaming of the model M2, which must contain all the observations that are not in
(W ∪O), by construction.
C : (P 3)M = {p. | p is an atom in Iguess}.
D : (P 5)M = P 5.
E : (P 6)M = {s← oi, wi. | obsi ∈ P
obs}.
F : (P 7)M = P 7.
G : (P 8)M = P 8.
H : (P 9)M = P 9.
Then, the result follows because of the following two properties:
Property P1: M is a model of L∨(P)M .
Proof. All the rules in L∨(P)M (see points A−H above) are satisfied by M :
– Rules in A are satisfied by M , as satC1 is in M .
– Rules in B are satisfied by M . Indeed, program P (P)W ,O[C2] coincides with P (P)W ,O modulo
a renaming of the predicate symbols, and IC2 is in fact a renaming of the unique stable modelM2
of P (P)W ,O , by construction. Then, the result follows since M2 is, by definition, the minimal
model of the positive program P (P)M2W ,O .
– Rules in C are satisfied by M since Iguess is a subset of M .
– Rules in D are satisfied by M since satC2, satC1, satC11, ..., satC1n are in M .
– Rules in E are satisfied by M . Indeed, the set Iguess is such that wi is in M if and only if
obsi ∈ W , and such that oi is in M if and only if obsi 6∈ O. Then, given that by definition
W ∩O = ∅, the body of such rules is always evaluated false in M .
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– Rules in F are satisfied by M since the head of each of these rules belongs to IC1 ∪ Iφ ∪ Ir, by
construction.
– Rules in G are satisfied by M since satC1 is in M .
– Rules in H are satisfied by M since the head of each of these rules belongs to IC1 ∪ Iφ ∪ Ir ∪
{satC11, ..., satC1n}, by construction.
Property P2: There is no model M ′ of L∨(P)M such that M ′ ⊂M .
Proof. Recall that program L∨(P)M has the form shown in points A−H above and assume, for the
sake of contradiction, that there is a model M ′ ⊂ M for L∨(P)M . First, observe that Iguess ⊆ M ′
(see point C). Moreover, because of the fact that {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (W ∪ O)} is a subset of IC2
(point B, above), it can be observed that M has in fact the form M = IC1 ∪ IC2 ∪ Iguess ∪ Iφ ∪
Ir ∪ {satC2, satC1, satC1i, ..., satC1n}.
Assume now that IC2 ∩M ′ ⊂ IC2. Then, IC2 ∩M ′ is a model for (P rls[C2] ∪ {obsC2i | obsi 6∈
(O ∪W)})I
C2
, i.e., for (P (P)W ,O[C2])I
C2
. It follows that the set M ′2 = {a | aC2 ∈ (IC2 ∩M ′)}
is also a model for P (P)M2W ,O (notice that (P (P)W ,O[C2])I
C2
coincides with P (P)M2W ,O modulo the
renaming of predicate symbols). However, M ′2 is also a subset of M2, and this is impossible because
M2 is the stable model of P (P)W ,O and, therefore, the minimal model of P (P)M2W ,O.
Therefore, IC2 ⊆ M ′. Consequently, M ′ ⊂ M implies by construction of the program L∨(P)
(rules in Step 9) that satC1 is not in M ′. Then, by carefully looking at rules in Step 8, the following
conclusion is reached:
(a) IC1 ∩M ′ does not contain a pair of atoms of the form pC1 and pC1 (rules 8.(a)) and each atom p
occurring in P rls ∪ P obs contains at least a fact in {pC1, pC1} (rules 7.(a)). In the following, let
M1 denote the set {a | aC1 ∈ (IC1 ∩M ′)}.
(b) For each atom p in M1, exactly one atom of the form pφi is in M ′ (rules 8.(b)). Thus, a mapping
φ can be defined from atoms in M1 to natural numbers such that φ(p) = i iff both pC1 and pφi
are in M ′.
(c) For each atom p in M1, exactly one atom of the form prj among those having p in their head
is in M ′ (rules 8.(c)). Thus, an assignment r can be defined from atoms in M1 to the rules of
P rls ∪ P obs such that r(p) = rj iff both pC1 and prj are in M ′ and p occurs in the head of rj.
(d) For each atom p in M1, the assignment r defined in point (c) above is such that:
i. r(p) is not a fact in P obs belonging to W (rules 8.(d)), i.e. p cannot be entailed by exploiting
a fact removed by P obs since it is part of the witness W;
ii. r(p) is a rule which does not contain an atom c in the body, where c is in M1 (rules 8.(e)),
i.e. p cannot be entailed by exploiting a rule which is not in the reduct (P rls)M1 since there
is a negated atom c in its body which is true in M1; combined with point (i) above, these two
constraints impose that r is an assignment of atoms to rules in P (P)M1W .
iii. b(r(p)) ⊆M1 (rules 8.(f));
iv. φ(q) < φ(p), for each q occurring positively in b(r(p)) (rules 8.(g)).
Armed with the properties above, it can be concluded that M ′ defines a mapping φ from M1 to rules
in P (P)M1W (with an associated mapping r for the atoms to the rules) such that all the conditions
in Lemma 1 are satisfied. Furthermore, by rules 2.(a) and 4.(b), M1 is a model for the program
P (P)W , otherwise satC1 would be entailed. Thus, M1 is trivially a model for P (P)M1W and, by
virtue of Lemma 1, it is in fact a stable model for P (P)W . However, such a stable model witnesses
that condition (1) in Definition 1 is violated, because of the rules in Step 5 and the fact that satC1
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is false in M ′, which entails the existence of an observation in the witness set W which is in M1.
Contradiction.
2. Let M be a stable model of L∨(P). First of all, note that by rules inserted into L∨(P) in Step 6 of the
algorithm, M is such that (i) for each letter obsi in P obs, oi and wi cannot belong simultaneously to
M , (ii) satC2 ∈ M , and (iii) satC1 ∈ M . Furthermore, by rules inserted into L∨(P) in Steps 3.(a)
and 3.(b) it is the case that, for each letter obsi in P rls, either oi or oi and either wi or wi belong to M .
Consider, now, the disjoint sets O = {obsi | oi ∈ M} and W = {obsi | wi ∈ M}. It will be shown
that both conditions in Definition 1 are satisfied. To this aim consider the interpretations IC1, Iguess,
and Ir defined in point (1) of this proof, and notice that M can be written as IC1 ∪ IC2 ∪ Iguess ∪ Iφ ∪
Ir ∪ {satC2, satC1, satC1i, ..., satC1n}, where IC2 is the subset of M containing all the predicates
in M of the form pC2 and pC2. Indeed, since satC1 is in M , the model must contain also the elements
in IC1 ∪ Iφ ∪ Ir ∪ {satC2, satC1i, ..., satC1n}. At this point the reader may check that the rules in
L∨(P)M have again the form illustrated in points A−H above.
To conclude, the following properties can be shown:
• P (P)W ,O 6|=c ¬W .
Proof. Given that M is a minimal model of L∨(P)M , it can be concluded that IC2 is a min-
imal model of (P rls[C2] ∪ {obsC2i | obsi 6∈ (W ∪ O)})M = (P (P)W ,O[C2])I
C2
. Then,
M2 = {a | a
C2 ∈ IC2} is a minimal model of (P (P)W ,O)M2 . Now, it can be shown that
P (P)W ,O 6|=c ¬W . Indeed, assume, for the sake of contradiction, that P (P)W ,O |=c ¬W . Then,
the stable model M2 does not contain any fact in W , and symmetrically IC2 does not contain any
fact of the form obsC2i , with obsi inW . Then, satC2 cannot be entailed by M , which is impossible.
• P (P)W |=c ¬W .
Proof. To this aim, observe that M is a minimal model of L∨(P)M and assume, for the sake of
contradiction, that there is a fact obsi in W and a stable model M1 for P (P)W such that obsi is in
M1. Then, given I¯C1 = {aC1 | a ∈ M1}∪{aC1 | a 6∈M1}, the set M ′ = I¯C1∪IC2∪Iguess∪ I¯φ∪ I¯r
is also a model for L∨(P)M , where I¯φ and I¯r encode the assignments φ and r in Lemma 1. Since
M ′ ⊂M , there is a contradiction with M being a stable model of L∨(P) ✷
This section concludes by observing that minimum-size outlier detection problems can be modelled
for general rule-observation pairs by exploiting the same approach used for the stratified pairs, i.e., by
introducing weak constraints in the program built by the algorithm in Figure 6. Specifically, given a pair
P, the algorithm can be modified by inserting into L∨(P) a constraint :∼ oi. for each obsi ∈ P obs.
Then, letting L∨,∼(P) be the transformed program, the same arguments as Theorem 22 with respect to the
construction of Theorem 23 can be used for showing that minimum-size outliers in P are in one-to-one
correspondence with best stable models of L∨,∼(P).
Theorem 24. Let P = 〈Prls,Pobs〉 be a rule-observation pair. Then,
1. for each minimum-size outlier O with witness W in P, there is a best stable model M of L∨,∼(P) such
that {obsi | oi ∈M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈ M} =W , and
2. for each best stable model M of L∨,∼(P), there is an outlier O with witness W in P, such that {obsi |
oi ∈M} = O and {obsi | wi ∈ M} =W .
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7 Related Work
In this section, the most relevant related work is discussed. Research work related to that presented in this
paper can be roughly divided into two groups: (i) work done on outlier detection from logic theories, which
is very relevant to our own, and (ii) work done on outlier detection from data, which is, on the contrary, less
related to concepts discussed in this paper.
7.1 Outlier detection from data
Outlier detection problems come in several different varieties within different settings, mainly investigated
in the area of statistics, machine learning and knowledge discovery in databases. In almost all cases the
presented approaches deal with data organized in a single relational table, often with all the attributes being
numerical, while a metrics relating each pair of rows in the table is required.
The approaches to outlier detection can be classified as supervised-learning based methods, where each
example must be labelled as exceptional or not [60, 77], and the unsupervised-learning based ones, where
such labels are not required. The latter methods are obviously more general than the former ones. As the
technique proposed in this work is unsupervised, the sequel of this section shall refer only to unsupervised
methods. In their turn, unsupervised-learning based methods for outlier detection can be categorized in
several groups.
The first group is that of statistical-based methods that assume that the given data set has a distribu-
tion model. Outliers are those objects that satisfy a discordancy test, i.e., which are significantly larger (or
smaller) in relation to the hypothesized distribution [11].
Deviation-based techniques identify outliers by inspecting the typical characteristics of objects and con-
sider an object that deviates from these features an outlier [10].
A completely different approach that finds outliers by observing low dimensional projections of the
search space is presented in [3]. Here, a point is considered an outlier if it deviates from the other data in
some subspace.
Further groups consists of density-based techniques [16], using a notion of local outlier that measures
the plausibility for an object to be an outlier with respect to the density of the local neighborhood.
Distance-based outlier detection was introduced by Knorr and Ng [55] to overcome the limitations of
statistical methods. A distance-based outlier is defined as follows: A point p in a data set is an outlier with
respect to parameters k and δ if at least k points in the data set lie at a distance greater than δ from p. This
definition generalizes the definition of outlier in statistics and is well suited when the data set does not fit
any standard distribution. Ramaswamy et al. [73] modified the above definition of outlier, since that does
not provide any ranking for outliers that are singled out. The new definition is based on the distance of the
k-th nearest neighbor of a point p, denoted with Dk(p), and it is as follows: Given k and n, a point p is an
outlier if no more than n− 1 other points q in the data set have a higher value for Dk(q) than p. This means
that the points q having the n greatest Dk(q) values are considered outliers. In [8] a new definition of outlier
that considers for each point the sum of the distances from its k nearest neighbors is proposed. The authors
presented an algorithm using the Hilbert space-filling curve that exhibits scaling results close to linear. An
analogous definition of outlier based on the k-nearest neighbors has been used in [32] for unsupervised
anomaly detection in intrusion detection applications. In [12] a near-linear time algorithm for the detection
of distance-based outliers exploiting randomization is presented.
The general differences and analogies between the approaches described above and our own should be
clearly understood. In fact, those approaches deal with “knowledge”, as encoded within one single relational
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table that is, in a sense, flat, i.e. such that there is no explicit relationship linking the objects (tuples) of the
data set under examination. Vice versa, the technique proposed in this work deals with complex knowl-
edge bases, which may well comprise relational-like information, but generally also include semantically
richer forms of knowledge, such as logical rules: in this latter case several complex relations relating ob-
jects (atoms) of the underlying theory might be explicitly available. As a consequence, even if the intuitive
and general sense of computing outliers in the two contexts is analogous, the conceptual and technical de-
velopments are quite different in the two contexts, just as the formal properties of computed outliers are
different.
7.2 Outlier detection using logic
Recently, outlier detection has emerged as an interesting knowledge representation and reasoning problem,
in the context of default logic [7].
In particular, [7] originally introduced and investigated the concept of outlier detection in the context
of default logics. In that context, we have a propositional default theory ∆ = (D,W ), where D is a set
of defaults and W is a set of propositional formulas. An outlier is then defined as a literal in W which is
not justified in ∆ with respect to a witness S ⊆ W . In that paper, the complexity of singling out outliers
was studied for several fragments of Reiter’s propositional default logics [75], that is, general propositional
theories, disjunction-free theories, normal mixed unary theories, unary and dual unary theories, and acyclic
unary and acyclic dual unary theories. The complexity results range from P to ΣP3 . In their analysis, the
authors investigated only the cautious form of reasoning and defined an outlier as a singleton set, thus the
concept of minimality has no meaning in that setting.
In this paper, the paradigm of [7] has been extended and generalized in several respects by (i) adapt-
ing the notion of outlier to the paradigm of logic programming in such a way that outliers are no longer
constrained to denote single individuals, (ii) investigating the complexity of the corresponding detection
problems, (iii) considering also the brave form of reasoning, (iv) defining significant minimization-based
outlier detection problems and studying their complexity, (v) extending the framework to have observations
encoded as a logic theory, and, finally, (vi) providing rewriting techniques for effective outlier detection
implementation.
In conclusion, let us observe that the class of default theories studied in [7] most related to general
logic programs is that of disjunction-free theories (DF). Indeed, it is well-known [42] that a general logic
program P can be translated into an equivalent DF default theory ∆(P ). However, the complexity results
in [7] cannot be straightforwardly translated to the case of theories expressed as logic programs, even in the
restricted framework of cautious reasoning for detecting outliers as individual elements.
Indeed, the hardness results in [7] for DF default theories rely on normal theories, whose relationships
with logic programs has been not studied in the literature so far. And, in fact, there seems to be not much
sense in translating a logic program into a normal default theory. Even a simple program like α ← not β
cannot be translated into normal defaults because some form of β is needed in the justifications. A form that
would properly translate into normal is α ← β, not ¬α, and this requires classical negation. Nevertheless,
if one has a program with no negation of any form, one can translate it to normal: α ← β can be translated
to β:α
α
. Since there is no negation, the extension one obtains will be equivalent to the stable model.
Furthermore, since normal default theories satisfy the semi-monotonicity property, it is not clear how
to design a polynomial-time translation from a logic program P under stable model semantics to a default
theory ∆(P ) ensuring a bijection between stable models of P and extensions of ∆(P ).
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8 Conclusion
In several knowledge-based applications, the scenario is significant where a rational agent equipped with
his own trustable knowledge about the world has some information coming from the outside in the form of
a set of observations denoting the status or facts about the external environment. Then, it is useful to let the
agent be capable of discovering those observations (if any) whose truth clashes to some extent with some
of the agent trustable beliefs. Such observations, called outliers, do indeed embody some abnormal status of
things which is interesting, at least, to be singled out and checked.
Differently from what is most often done in the literature, outliers have been defined in the paper on
the basis of some logical properties, rather than being determined by statistical characteristics. In particular,
by extending the work presented in [7], the concept of outlier has been formalized in the framework of
logic-programming based knowledge systems under both cautious and brave stable model semantics.
It has been shown that for a fact being an outlier depends on the given observation context: a fact may
well be an outlier within a given observation set, while being normal in some other one. In words, it has
been illustrated that outliers can be detected on the basis of observations to hand, by eventually singling out
some properties standing out for their abnormality. In the proposed setting, it is in fact necessary to single
out a supporting set, called the witness set, for the outlier to be singled out in turn.
The aim of the paper has been that of formalizing several variants of outlier detection problems, of
showing their complexity and providing algorithms for outlier detection via rewriting.
The outlier detection framework introduced here resembles such important notions in AI such as diagno-
sis and abductive reasoning and belief revision. Still, several important differences are there that confirm the
usefulness of such novel formalization: belief revision, abduction and other reasoning task related to outlier
detection have been comparatively discussed in the paper, where such differences have been highlighted.
Complexity figures obtained for outlier detection problems are summarized in Figure 3 and 4 referring,
respectively, to the basic and the min-cost variant of the problems. The complexity results show that outlier
detection can be sometimes easy but it is intractable in most cases.
An interesting scenario, which has been analyzed as well in the paper, occurs when one focuses on the
complexity of the problem where only the observation component is assumed to vary (that is, to denote the
problem input), whereas the rule component is assumed to be fixed. This is the complexity measure known
as data complexity, and is relevant whenever the size of the evidence data is large as compared to the size of
the knowledge base formalizing his expected properties.
Moreover, the case where the observations are encoded as a logical theory, rather than “simple” sets of
facts, has been considered. The concept of outlier has been properly generalized to arrange this idea, and the
computational complexity of the problems arising in this extended setting has been also accounted for in the
paper.
Finally, sound and complete translations of outlier problems have been provided into equivalent infer-
ence problems under stable model semantics. These translations can be taken advantage of in order for
effectively implementing outlier detection on top of any available stable model solver (e.g., [49, 61, 67, 63]).
Several research questions are left often by the paper. As far as the basic definition of outliers (and
associated witness) is concerned, it might be investigated whether there are some alternative notions that
appear convenient for modelling abnormality in the observations to hand in some specific kinds of applica-
tion. As an example, one may study a notion where condition (1) in Definition 1 is provided according to
the brave (resp., cautious) semantics, while condition (2) is provided according to the cautious (resp., brave)
semantics, and investigate how this notion compare with the one proposed in the paper.
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As far as the complexity studies are concerned, it is believed to be relevant to have the picture proposed
in the paper completed by investigating the combined complexity of detection problems for first-order pro-
grams, i.e., to study a setting where both the rule and the observation component are considered part of the
input problem.
Finally, from the application side, it would be interesting to study whether logic-based outlier detection
may have some fruitful applications in the database context, e.g., whether it can support the handling of
sophisticated kinds of constraint or whether it can be even practicable as a data mining technique. Indeed,
even though outlier detection problems appear to be intractable in most cases (unless P = NP), it might be
still the case that suitable algorithms, approximations and heuristics can be defined to cope with them in an
efficient way.
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